the disturbing UN report on the crimes of the "Islamic State"/ISIS/IS/Desh

including the possibility of genocide. The report can be found here. Nothing more to add, it speaks for itself:


17. Based on interviews conducted with victims and witnesses, and corroborated by other sources, the mission collected information regarding the killing of members of the Yezidi community and acts that caused serious bodily or mental harm to members of this group. Information also pointed to the intent of ISIL to destroy the Yezidi as a group when perpetrating these acts and to the existence of a manifest pattern of attacks against this community whose identity is based on their religious beliefs. If confirmed, such conduct may amount to genocide. Numerous Yezidi witnesses provided credible and consistent accounts, involving separate incidents and attacks, detailing how they were forced to convert to Islam or face death.

18. At the beginning of August 2014, a series of systematic and widespread attacks took place against a backdrop of ISIL incursions into the Ninewa plains and Yezidi populated cities and villages. Interviews with numerous victims and witnesses from al-‘Adnaniya, al-Qahtaniya, Barah, Bazwaya, Dogore, Gogjali, Hardan, Khanasor, Kocho, Qani, Sharf ad-Din, Sinjar city, Solagh, Tel Banat, Tel Qasab and Zummar point to a pattern, whereby members of ISIL systematically separated the men from the women and young children; the men were subsequently taken away to nearby ditches and summarily executed. Some victims and witnesses added that they had been asked to convert to Islam and that the men who refused were killed, while in other instances even the men who converted were still summarily executed. Men who managed to survive such executions, largely through being shielded by the bodies of other victims, relayed their accounts to the investigation team. Women and children who were held captive near execution sites also witnessed some executions. In some instances, villages were entirely emptied of their Yezidi population.

19. For instance, on 3 August, in Qani village (Sinjar) at least 80 men were killed in a single incident. The mission interviewed survivors. One of them recounted how they were rounded up and taken to a nearby ditch where ISIL opened fire on them. He added that at least 50 members of his extended family were killed. In Kocho, at least 700 men were killed in August. A survivor of one of the several Kocho village (Sinjar) massacres recounted that around 11 August, Yezidi men who refused to covert were separated from the women and then taken to a farm. An ISIL fighter told them ‘you will see now what will happen to you, you pagans and peacock worshippers’. Although the villagers were initially given assurances that they would be freed once they handed over their possessions, ISIL divided the men in four groups of 15, and took them to a farm on the outskirts of Kocho village. The Yezidi men were ordered to lay down facing the ground; they were filmed by ISIL fighters before being shot several times. Survivors informed the mission that some residents from surrounding areas assisted ISIL in perpetrating such killings. Witnesses consistently reported that ISIL fighters acted upon direct orders they received via telephone.

20. ISIL fighters abducted Yezidis on a mass scale, and detained many for months. For instance, a group of 196 disabled Yezidis, including elderly, children and ill persons were held captive in Mosul and Tel Afar and only released in January 2015. Many victims were forced to convert to Islam during their captivity. Around 3,000 persons, mainly Yezidis, allegedly remain in ISIL captivity. Further investigation is needed to establish the precise number of those who continue to be held by ISIL as well as the numbers killed, estimated to be in the thousands.

37. Girls and unmarried women who escaped from ISIL captivity consistently recounted the process by which they were raped and sexually enslaved. ISIL members numbered them or recorded names on lists, and inspected them to evaluate their beauty. While some were given as ‘gifts,’ others were sold to local or foreign ISIL fighters. Some victims were privy to price negotiations between ‘vendors’ and ‘buyers.’ An ‘emir’10 would instruct ISIL fighters to inspect and choose girls for ‘marriage.’ Girls would then be prepared for ‘marriage’ (rape) involving, in some cases, full body searches. Mission investigators met with victims as young as 11 years of age.11 A 30 year-old woman detailed how young girls were prepared for sale at a house in Mosul. They were ordered to stand and remove their headscarves to be inspected. Then they were forced to smile while ISIL fighters took photographs.

38. A victim witnessed similar cruel and inhuman treatment following her transfer to Adnaani, a 15-minute drive from Ba’aj, Ninewa governorate. She recounted that an ‘emir’ wrote the names of 14 girls on small pieces of paper and called two ISIL fighters who both picked one piece of paper. The ‘emir’ asked the ISIL fighters to call out the name written on the paper. The 15 and 18 year old girls whose names were called were forcibly taken by the two fighters into another room. The ‘emir’ and a so-called ‘Imam’ who was in the room laughed when they heard the two girls screaming. After around 20 minutes, the two girls were brought back into the room. The witness said both girls were in shock and had blood on their trousers. Both confirmed to the witness that they had been ‘married’ (raped).

39. A 19-year-old pregnant married woman explained that she was repeatedly raped by an ISIL ‘doctor’ for two and a half months in Hawija District, Kirkuk governorate.12 There were visible lacerations on her breast, indicating she may have been tortured. According to the woman, the doctor sat on her stomach, aiming to kill her unborn child, saying, “this baby should die because it is an infidel; I can make a Muslim baby.”

40. The mission obtained credible reports about the rape of young girls, including nine and six year-olds. The former was raped for three days by an ISIL fighter in Tel Qaseb, Ninewa governorate. A witness stated that she could clearly hear the girl being assaulted and screaming out her name for help. The girl told the witness that she was blindfolded, handcuffed, beaten and repeatedly raped. Eventually, her ‘owner’ sold her to another ISIL fighter from Syria. In the same house, a six year-old girl was raped by another ISIL fighter. A witness heard the child screaming.13 She was reportedly sold to an ISIL fighter in Syria.

41. Witnesses reported that a doctor conducted abortions on two women in a school in Ba’aj, Ninewa, who were two and three months pregnant, respectively. Prior to the abortion, one witness reportedly heard an ISIL fighter stating: “we do not want more Yezidis to be born.” Both women received an injection and were made to take pills. A week after the abortion, both women were sold.
42. Women who escaped ISIL custody recounted how they were forcibly transferred multiple times to different locations, including Adnaani, al-Nufus, Ba’aj, Fallujah, Gayara, Hawija, Khaini, Kirkuk, Kocho, Mosul,14 Rambosi, Sheba, Solagh, Tel Afar,15 Tel Qaseb, Tel Banat and Wardya in Iraq. Other women and children were transferred to al-Hassakeh, al-Shadadiyah, Deir-ez-Zoor, Ghazna, Membij, Raqqa and Tel Abyad in Syria.

43. Many survivors of sexual violence experienced the loss of loved ones killed by ISIL. Some witnessed these attacks and are severely traumatised. Suicides and attempted suicides have sharply risen amongst these women and girls. Many survivors interviewed displayed visible signs of trauma and depression. The mission spoke to men who were desperate and felt helpless being separated from their wives and children. One stated: “losing my wife and children to ISIL is the worst nightmare that could happen to a man.”

Russian soldiers in Ukraine?

Ever since the end of the Second World War, most armed conflicts have been non-international in character, with major powers often being involved indirectly by providing funds, weapons, training, and similar assistance to local forces. We have seen this pattern in Syria and, so it seemed, in Eastern Ukraine. To frame it in legal terms: States use indirect force (which is of course also covered by the prohibition of the use of force, cf the good old Nicaragua judgment), but refrain from direct force, i.e. sending their own troops. However, concerning Ukraine, the New York Times reported on the direct involvement Russian special forces in Eastern Ukraine as early as April 2014:
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/21/world/europe/photos-link-masked-men-in-east-ukraine-to-russia.html?_r=0

Prompted by these reports, VICE News tried to find the soldier shown on the picture and proving that the allegations were not correct, at least not in the sense as described by the New York Times:

On the diplomatic plane, allegations indicating direct involvement in the sense of Russian soldiers themselves being present were voiced by France during Security Council Meeting 7165 from 29 April 2014:

We are witnessing a a subversive operation that has been planned, barely disguised and orchestrated by Russia. Russian special forces do not even hide anymore. Some time ago, our Russian colleague denied their involvement in Crimea, while his President recognized it a few days later. No doubt, he will do the same with respect to current events in Ukraine. France strongly and unequivocally condemns those unacceptable attempts by Russia to destabilize Ukraine.

However, Russia has consistently denied at least direct involvement in the sense of sending its own troops to Ukraine at the same Security Meeting for instance (and throwing a verbal punch at the US and its large number of military bases abroad):

With regard to armed forces, our armed forces are on Russian territory. American forces are hardly at home. They are in Australia, Lithuania, Poland and on the Black Sea, where an American vessel has remained longer than it was invited to do. Yes, our troops do conduct training exercises. But they do so in a transparent manner and while upholding all existing international agreements. We do not have any aggressive intentions towards Ukraine. They Kyiv Government should keep a cool head and not engage in reckless activities with respect to the people in the south-east of the country, where there are many Russian citizens as well.

While Russia hasn't changed its official position until fairly recently at least (see http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/putin-denies-russian-troops-are-in-ukraine-decrees-certain-deaths-secret/2015/05/28/9bb15092-0543-11e5-93f4-f24d4af7f97d_story.html), it seems to become harder to maintain every day. As a recent video by VICE News shows, everyone with a computer can determine that it seems very likely that Russian soldiers are present on Ukrainian territory. After all, they themselves, while not wearing official insignia, seem to have posted revealing pictures on Russian social network sites. Web 2.0 indeed does have some strange side effects.

Unabhängige Medien, they said

Unabhängiger staatlicher Rundfunk, Gebühren für die Objektivität, die Private nicht bieten können. So lautet die klassische Rechtfertigung fürs de facto-pay-tv ORF. Dass dem nicht so ist, kann man im seinerseits freilich alles andere als unabhängigen "Österreich" lesen, wo ganz unverblümt darüber geschrieben wird, dass der österreichische Bundeskanzler Werner Faymann Gerhard Zeiler den Posten als ORF-General "anbieten" könnte. Was er ja wirklich kann. Immer wieder spannend zu sehen, was hierzulande als völlig normal gilt.

Asylum crisis: searching for voices of reason

debating issues of immigration and asylum seekers is a tough task these days; fears concerning the changing face of Europe, the unresolved question as to how to integrate Muslims within our societies and dramatic, saddening stories make it hard to take a reasonable stand on this emotional topic. Pete Collier, author of the excellent book "The bottom billion" seems to have somewhat managed to find the middle path between "all asylum seekers are bad" and "let's open the European borders for everyone". But read yourself:

[...] migration – up to a point – is good for all concerned, Collier reckons. It certainly provides economic returns to the migrants themselves and helps, on balance, the societies from which they came. Although there are some social costs, it does not – contrary to the claims of extremists – drive down wages for indigenous workers in the host country. The only group that suffers economically from the competition posed by immigrant workers is the previous wave of immigrants. "Moderate migration," Collier concludes, "is modestly advantageous."
The big danger lies in runaway migration. Collier identifies an "acceleration principle" intrinsic to the migration process. While massive emigration does not, it seems, drive up incomes in countries of origin, a growing diaspora of migrants in the host country eases the practicalities of migration, and adds further momentum to the trend. Runaway migration threatens to outpace the absorption of the diaspora in the home country – with worrying social consequences – and will eventually impose the much-touted downward pressure on indigenous wages.
Worse still, the country of origin will also be denuded of its human capital. Haiti, for example, has already lost about 85% of its educated workers. Very poor countries which also happen to be small are acutely vulnerable to the effects of high emigration.
Collier parts company with those economists who champion open-doors migration on the grounds that it maximises "global utility"; that, because the gainers gain so much more than the losers lose, the losers' interests can simply be written off. He argues instead that nations are "legitimate moral units" that must be taken seriously – whether small poor nations, with their intractable and worsening problems, or successful modernised nations. Post-national visionaries forget that it is "the fruits of successful nationhood" that attract migrants in the first place.
Yet mass immigration jeopardises feelings of national solidarity, which in turn seems to drive western societies in a dangerously rightward direction. What Collier terms "mutual regard" – a shared sympathy with one's fellow citizens – is an essential precondition of redistributive taxation. Robert Putnam, the leading American sociologist, has shown that the higher the proportion of immigrants in a community, the lower the levels of trust not only between indigenous and immigrant populations, but also within these groups. [...]

http://www.theguardian.com/books/2013/sep/19/exodus-immigration-paul-collier-review

von Wörtern aus anderen Sprachwelten

fürs Sprachen lernen gibt es bekanntlich unzählige Gründe; mit jeder Sprache wird es einfacher, man kann mit vielen Menschen (besser) kommunizieren, bekommt unzählige Einblicke in neue Welten, die ansonsten nicht möglich wären und es fördert ganz allgemein die Intelligenz beziehungsweise vermindert es das Altern der Gehirnwindungen. Aber ein besonderer Grund besteht darin, dass es in viele Sprachen Begriffe für Dinge haben, die man dann und wann verspürt oder wahrnimmt, ohne sie betiteln zu können. So etwa "Yakamoz", türkisches Wort für das Spiegeln des Mondlichts im Wasser; "Saudade", die portugiesische Form der Sehnsucht; oder Lehkost (tschechisch) für Leichtigkeit. Für diese und ganz andere viele schöne Wörter siehe http://cms.ifa.de/fileadmin/content/informationsforum/images/abc/abc_broschuere.pdf

die "Deutschland ist eine GmbH"-Debatte macht selbst vor Toiletten nicht Halt

so gesehen auf einem WC der juristischen Fakultät der Universität Augsburg:

 BRD = GmbH -> kein anerkannter Staat [Antwort: Staatsvolk: Check, Staatsgebiet: Check, Staatsgewalt: Check, inklusive Verweis auf Degenhardt, Staatsrecht, S. 3)
                             - nicht souveränt
-> kein gültiger Friedensvertrag seit '45
-> Nachforschan
-> gegen die Schweigespirale

why working conditions in International Organizations are so bad

In a brand new article in IOLR, the legal adviser of NATO explains why bad working conditions are necessary for their functioning. Worth read for all those eager to pursue a career in this field:

"the notion of precarious employment within international organizations is inherent in their evolving nature and, therefore, necessary for the survival of international organizations.
[...] We have seen that many international organizations’ employment practices are very similar, and that they often provide only relative, non-permanent employment guarantees. However, these apparently negative practices seem to benefit the overall functioning of these institutions. Nevertheless, the pursuit of precarious employment practices affects one of the core elements of international organizations’ esprit de corps — loyalty. The pernicious effects of weak or non-existent allegiance among international staff members create vulnerabilities for international organizations, which may reach the point that the relevant organization’s constitutional
objectives cannot be met."

Andrés Muñoz Mosquera, 'On the Notion of Precarious Employment in International Organizations' 11  international organizations law review (2014), 294-317

good read on Syria

The Syrian government does not publish casualty figures by sect, but martyrs’ notices pasted on the walls in Jabal Alawia, the Alawite heartland in the hills east of the port of Latakia, indicate that the Alawites have suffered a disproportionate share of deaths in the war to preserve the Alawite president. A myth promulgated by the Sunni Islamist opposition is that the Alawites have been the main beneficiaries of forty-four years of Assad family rule over Syria, but evidence of Alawite wealth outside the presidential clan and entourage is hard to find. The meager peasant landholdings that marked the pre-Assad era are still the rule in Jabal Alawia, where most families live on the fruits of a few acres. Some Alawite merchants have done better in the seaside cities of Latakia and Tartous, but so have Sunni, Druze, and Christian businessmen. This may explain in part why, from my own observations, a considerable proportion of Syrian Sunnis, who comprise about 75 percent of the population, have not taken up arms against the regime. If they had, the regime would not have survived.
The rising number of Alawite young men killed or severely wounded while serving in the army and in regime-backed militias has led to resentment among people who have no choice other than to fight for President Assad and to keep their state’s institutions intact. Their survival, as long as Sunni jihadists kill them wherever they find them, requires them to support a regime that many of them oppose and blame for forcing them into this predicament.

 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/nov/06/syria-we-dont-know/ 

In addition, there is new insight from VICE news, including the alliance between "moderates" and Islamist groups in their recent advances against Assad's troops:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d-2uvKfYGQ4