Frankreich ruft den EU-Beistandsfall aus: Muss Österreich jetzt in den Krieg?

die kurze Antwort: Nein. Wegen der sogenannten "Irischen Klausel" in Artikel 42(7) Vertrag über die Europäische Union (nachfolgend fett):

(7) Im Falle eines bewaffneten Angriffs auf das Hoheitsgebiet eines Mitgliedstaats schulden die anderen Mitgliedstaaten ihm alle in ihrer Macht stehende Hilfe und Unterstützung, im Einklang mit Artikel 51 der Charta der Vereinten Nationen. Dies lässt den besonderen Charakter der Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik bestimmter Mitgliedstaaten unberührt.

Ohne diese Bestimmung wäre Österreichs Neutralität spätestens mit dem Vertrag von Lissabon in jedem Fall nicht mehr gegeben. Auch so lässt sich fragen, inwiefern die EU-Mitgliedschaft sich mit der Neutralität vereinbaren lässt: Schließlich ist die EU, wie man gerade jetzt sieht, ein Verteidigungsbündnis und die Mitgliedschaft in einem solchen ist laut Neutralitätsgesetz eigentlich nicht möglich. Dagegen wird argumentiert, dass die EU aufgrund der irischen Klausel kein klassisches Verteidigungsbündnis sei (jedenfalls nciht im Sinne des Neutralitätsgesetzes; siehe dazu auch diesen ausführlicheren Beitrag von Franz Leidenmühler), weil Österreich gewissermaßen ein Trittbrettfahrer ist – es kann, muss aber nicht bei der Verteidigung anderer Staaten helfen, gleichzeitig kann es die Unterstützung anderer Staaten einfordern. Dagegen lässt sich freilich einwenden, dass der Status als Verteidigungsbündnis unabhängig von den jeweiligen Verpflichtungen ist und das Neutralitätsgesetz genuine Blockfreiheit gemeint hat; womit die EU auch als einseitig-bevorteilendes Verteidigungsbündnis eigentlich gegen gegen das Neutralitätsgesetz verstößt. Insofern wird die (Rechts-)Praxis beim derzeitigen Anlassfall von höchstem Interesse sein.

a few thoughts on the Paris attacks

there are countless ways to cope with stressful, unforeseen, and disturbing events. Break-ups, the death of a beloved one, or terrorist attacks like those that took place in Paris yesterday, November 13th.
One is to write. Writing helps to structure thoughts and emotions. Sometimes – not always – to gain some distance from the topic dominating your thoughts. That's why people keep diaries, blogs, or, albeit to a different extent due to the 140 character limit, Twitter accounts. Or why some post status updates on Facebook. Obviously, a diary is just for yourself, while the other formats can be read by everyone (while, obviously, most blogs, including this one, are read by a handful of people). You want to be heard, or, at least, you like the thought that you could be heard.

First, terror in general. It has been with us since 9/11 at least. It has brought terror on the soil of the so-called "Western" nations. Of course, there were earlier attacks, the 1986 Berlin discotheque bombing ("La Belle") or the 1993 attacks on the World Trade Center, the first Islamist strikes on US soil. But 9/11 was a game changer and there is no need to write extensively on its impact. Everyone who had reached a certain age at that time remembers the attacks or what he or she did when they occurred. It has reached Europe with the Madrid and London strikes. After a few smaller attacks that triggered a comparatively small outcry, this is the first major attack since then.

Paris reminds us of an inalienable and sad truth: Terror can not be successfully prevented. You can reduce its probability, yes. But you can not eliminate it altogether. Even the most totalitarian state imaginable could not achieve this. It does not take more than a few or even only one determined man and a weapon or explosive belt. Once again, we have to remind ourselves of the need to strike a delicate balance between freedom and security. Easier said than done, obviously. But this must not be forgotten now that politicians rally for more restrictive measures of all kinds, in particular superveillance. Eliminating terrorism altogether is impossible.

The war on terror. It must not be forgotten that France has not only been partly targeted as a symbol for "the West" but primarily because of its role in the fight against the Islamic State (ISIS/IS/ISIL). The Islamic State would not stand a chance against a well-equipped army in an open confrontation. Hence it resorts to terror. It aims at the backbone of liberal democracies, its population. This is what islamist terrorism has been doing over and over again in order to overcome its military inferiority. Spreading fear. In the era of facebook, Youtube, and Twitter, this seems to be easier than ever. A decade ago, we would have been informed via TV, radio-broadcasts, or perhaps because via text messages sent by friends. Now there are even more means to inform us in real-time, with every detail and all sorts of accompanying rumours, thoughts, and commentary. Facebook tells us that people we know are safe or helps us to change our profile picture to "show support". Paris feels as if it was just around the corner.

Some people talk of "selective mourning" and remind us of other terrorist attacks or events that cost countless lives. Media coverage aside, Facebook seems to have opened Pandora's box by enabling the temporary profile picture function. Where do we stop, or, more importantly, where to we start? What other places, events, or armed conflicts should be included? How many dead does it need?
Human nature seems to dictate us to relate more to people that are culturally closer to us than others. Paris is one of the most popular cities to travel to, it is featured in countless movies and we know people living there from Erasmus or other means to study abroad. Even in 2015, we have not overcome tribalism or collectivism. One must further not forget that yesterday's attacks are not only a reaction to the French involvement in the fight against IS/ISIS, but also, as terrorism in general, directed against the concept commonly referred to as "the West". Against the "Western lifestyle", "Western habits", "Western culture". Relatedly, the current wave of attention is not only owed to empathy but also to fear. We are afraid, we could have also been targeted. We could have been at the concert or at the stadium. It is harder than ever to distance oneself, as it was the case after 9/11, by saying that the Americans were party to be blamed themselves and that Europe was comparatively safe as its track record of interference in Islamist countries was not as bad as that of the US.

Psychologically, we must also not forget that empathy is necessarily limited. If we tried to feel empathy for each and every case of human suffering, we would have to kill ourselves over sorrow after having read only the first pages of any newspaper. Is the coldness we feel in connection with many events a reason to remind ourselves of all the other horrors occurring on a daily basis? Yes and no. Yes, so as to avoid occupying ourselves with certain matters while ignoring other, perhaps even more troublesome tragedies. No, or at least only to a certain extent, because of the well-known effect of desensitization.

Normalcy. How long does it take until people start posting videos or pictures of cats again? Until debates are not dominated by this subject? Who are the first to do so?

Facebook (yes, Facebook again). At the beginning, it felt somewhat strange how the Facebook newsfeed algorithm mixed regular (older) posts of all kind with those related to Paris. But upon closer inspection, the "real world" is no different. Yes, people talked about Paris. But at the same time, they ate, talked about other subjects, went out dancing, or read books before going to sleep. Just remember the famous picture showing a group of people sitting and laughing together while you can see the burning WTC in the background (see here).

Western values. There has been an endless debate on this topic. It will keep us occupied for the next decades not only because of Islamism but also because of the refugee crisis and the growth of the Muslim population in Europe. It still seems as if we are not entirely sure what exactly we understand as "our" values. Or, at the very least, seem to be overwhelmed by the simple fact that the freedom of religion clahes with other human rights, first and foremost the freedom of expression, and, more generally, the idea of a secular state. A problem further exacerbated by the fact that many shy away from discussing or criticising Islam and values associated with over fear of being accused of racism.

Lastly, since it is my field of expertise, a few words on international law. Hollande called the attacks an "act of war". His speech can be read as a resort to the concept of "armed attack" in the sense of Article 51. Other acts of terrorism characterized as armed attacks and commonly accepted as triggering the right to self-defense include 9/11, Hezbollah against Israel in 2006, or Hamas against Israel in 2008/2009 and the summer of 2014. While, in particular in connection with the ICJ's Wall-opinion, it has been argued that self-defense can only be invoked against attacks carried out by states, this position has now become even more difficult to maintain. As of now, France is even mulling over invoking Article 5 of the NATO pact meaning that an attack against one member constitutes an attack against all NATO states and they would thus have to react together. This would only be the second time in the history of NATO (the first was after 9/11).

Libya and Operation Unified Protector 4 years on

More than four and a half years have passed since Security Council resolution 1973 and the subsequent NATO airstrikes (Operation Unified Protector) against Gaddafi's regime. Back then, the operation was called a success for having had only a minimal impact on the civilian population, the great level of cooperation and the decisive role of other NATO member states than the US and contributing to the overthrow of Gaddafi. Euphoria was everywhere, the Responsibility to Protect was "Alive and Well" (Thomas G Weiss) and an article in Foreign Affairs published in December 2012 described Libya as "one of the most successful countries to emerge from the uprisings that have rocked the Arab world over the past two years" (Dirk Vandewalle, 'After Qaddafi. The Surprising Success of the New Libya' 91 Foreign Affairs 8).
Obviously, academia and the international community have sobered up in recent years. Libya, one of the countries with the highest living standards (although far from being a paradise and controlled in a quasi-Stalinistic fashion by Gaddafi), is close to being a failed state (it is ranked #25 on the 2015 Fragile State Index), with two parallel governments competing for control, a crumbling health sector and a drastically deteriorating access to food. As Bernardino León, Special Representative of the Secretary-General
and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya summarized the situation at a Security Council Meeting from late August 2015 (worthy to be quoted extensively):

Fifteen months since the start of military operations in Benghazi, in the east, it is clear that the confrontations between the parties have gradually transformed into a war of trenches, with no imminent end foreseen. In the interim, the status quo is exacting a heavy toll on the civilian population and on whatever remains of the city’s much-damaged infrastructure. More than 100,000 of Benghazi’s population remain internally displaced, and 70 per cent of the city’s health facilities are either inaccessible or not functioning.
The situation in the south is equally appalling. The absence of the State and of a proper functioning security apparatus has exacerbated local competition among tribal groups for power and resources — a conflict that has its roots in decades-long marginalization and neglect by central authorities. At the national level, the scale of human suffering is staggering for a country with large oil reserves and strong economic potential. According to different United Nations agencies, an estimated 1.9 million people require urgent humanitarian assistance to meet their basic health-care needs. Access to food is now a major problem for some 1.2 million people, mostly in Benghazi and the east. The number of internally displaced persons across Libya now stands at approximately 435,000. The health-care system is on the verge of collapse, with many hospitals across the country overcrowded and operating at severely reduced capacity, and many reporting acute shortages of medicines, vaccines and medical equipment. Power cuts are endemic in many areas of the country. Some neighbourhoods, such as in Benghazi, are enduring electricity cuts almost around the clock.
Close to 250,000 migrants are estimated to be in the country or transiting through it, many of them facing significant protection issues, including arbitrary arrest and detention in abusive conditions, sexual abuse, forced labour, exploitation and extortion. This year alone, more than 2,000 migrants have drowned in the Mediterranean Sea, the vast majority in a desperate bid to make the sea crossing from Libya to Europe’s southern shores.
At the same time, the country’s economy continues to contract rapidly, the result of a significant reduction in oil revenues due to falling oil prices and low oil production from Libya’s oilfields. Libya’s financial reserves are also being heavily depleted, in large part as the result of unsustainable expenditures on non-productive items. The political-institutional crisis in the country has also manifested itself in growing competition over key financial and other sovereign institutions.Against that grim backdrop of growing hardship and misery stemming from deteriorating security and general lawlessness, widespread violations and abuses of international human rights and humanitarian law continue with impunity across the country. Armed groups from all sides continue to abduct civilians on account of their political opinions or identity, often in the hope of exchanging them in return for a ransom or for the release of fighters or other civilians taken by rival groups. Not even humanitarian aid workers have been spared.

Preventing and/or ending gross human rights abuses were the primary motives behind the intervention in Libya. It was feared that Gaddafi's forces would continue to use excessive force not only against his military adversaries but also against the civilian population, in particular in Benghazi, which was explicitly mentioned in resolution 1973. Nevertheless, when deciding whether to intervene and how, long-term prospects also need to be taken into account. While it is absolutely unclear what Libya would look like absent a military intervention or if NATO had refrained from taking sides but rather eg established safe havens for civilians or to establish a ceasefire with a possible divide of the country until a political solution is found, one may doubt whether that happened. Rather, the motives behind intervening in Libya seem to be a mixture of having grasped the opportunity to get rid of a dictator who had been in charge for too long, committed too many grave mistakes (remember Lockerbie or the1986 Berlin discotheque bombing) and controlled one of the oil-richest countries in the world, addressing demands to "do something" in Libya, and perhaps build up a new allied state in the region.
In sum, the current situation clearly shows the extent of miscalculation or ignorance when it came to the political dynamics in tribal Libya. One may thus doubt whether Operation Unified Protector is still seen as a 'model intervention' and if the interveners would act differently today. Removing a dictator is comparatively easy, but the West's (and in particular the US') bad track record in establishing or at least contributing to a functioning, stable, and even democratic state has certainly not improved with the outcome of the intervention Libya.

Turkey's legal justification for its recent attacks against the Kurds and ISIS/ISIL

first and foremost, the official notification by Turkey concerning its attacks against ISIS/ISIL in Syria can be found here: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2015_563.pdf 

Similar to the US and its allies, Turkey relies on the right to self-defence and, more specifically, the "unwilling or unable"-doctrine, as the legal basis for striking against ISIS/ISIL inside Syria. Most interestingly, however, the letter to the Security Council does not refer to the threat emanating from Kurdish fighters but only ISIS/ISIL (Daesh):

The terrorist attack that took the lives of 32 Turkish citizens in Suruç on 20 July 2015 reaffirms that Turkey is under a clear and imminent threat of continuing attack from Daesh. Most recently, on 23 July 2015, Daesh attacked the border military post in Elbeyli and killed a Turkish soldier.
It is apparent that the regime in Syria is neither capable of nor willing to prevent these threats emanating from its territory, which clearly imperil the security of Turkey and the safety of its nationals.
Individual and collective self-defence is our inherent right under international law, as reflected in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.
On this basis, Turkey has initiated necessary and proportionate military actions against Daesh in Syria, including in coordination with individual members of the Global Coalition, in order to counter the terrorist threat and to safeguard its territory and citizens.

The legal basis for its military strikes against Iraq, then, is the consent given by the Iraqi government:
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-220_-31-july-2015_-press-release-regarding-the-statement-of-the-iraqi-government-about-turkey_s-operations-towards-the-pkk-targets.en.mfa:

His Excellency called on the Turkish government to coordinate with the Iraqi government about any military operation in those areas, stressing Iraq's keenness on Turkey's internal security and its people's safety, praising the Turkish decision which allowed the use of its airbases by the international coalition to attack the terrorist Daesh organization. 

Regarding the attacks against Kurdish fighters located in Iraq, however, the Iraqi government has voiced harsh criticism which comes close to a (partial) withdrawal of its consent, or at least a threat of doing so, denouncing these as "a dangerous escalation and an assault on Iraqi sovereignty" and calling on Turkey to avoid further escalation and seek a resolution to the crisis.

As a reaction, Turkey has stated that Iraq was not fulfilling its duty to prevent any attacks/not to harbor such "terrorists". All in all, it seems as if Turkey is stretching the Iraqi acceptance to conduct attacks against ISIS/ISIL and the Kurds on its territory quite far; however, as long as Iraq does not expliticitly withdraw its consent, there is a legal basis for the Turkish attack:

[...] the negative attitude adopted by the Iraqi Government regarding the steps taken by Turkey within the framework of international of law towards the terrorist attacks faced by our country and the operations conducted by Turkey, in this context, against the PKK terrorist organization located within the borders of Iraq has caused disappointment.

Although the Iraqi Government emphasizes its commitment for not allowing any attack towards Turkey from the Iraqi territories, it is clear that this commitment has not been fulfilled and numerous armed PKK militants have continued to harbor in the Iraqi territory for years. Therefore it is not possible to comprehend or accept that those, who cannot fulfill their commitments, do not have the possibility to keep their borders under control, and one-third of whose territories are under the control of the terrorist organization, have taken a stance against Turkey in its fight against the PKK terrorist organization perpetrating armed attacks towards its citizens and security forces.

That being said, although there is indeed a (somewhat shaky) legal justification – in line with those which have been invoked by other states in attacking ISIS/ISIL in the past, the problem is that Turkey does not restrict its attacks against this group. It is obvious that the balance between striking against ISIS/ISIL and, simultaneously, against the Kurds, the most reliable allies of the West and the US in particular, will cause political and, relatedly, perhaps also legal problems in the near future. Until now, however, Iraq would only withdraw or expliticly restrict its consent for military strikes by Turkey if the US allows it to do so (which seems highly unlikely for the time being).

Here are also a few good articles on the Syria/Iraq/ISIS/ISIL/Kurds-quagmire:

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33747980 (scroll down for some helpful infographics)
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/31/turkey-goes-to-war-syria-rebels/
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/turkey-conflict-with-kurds-was-approving-air-strikes-against-the-pkk-americas-worst-error-in-the-middle-east-since-the-iraq-war-10417381.html
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/29/whats-behind-turkeys-u-turn-on-the-islamic-state-kurds-syria/
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/28/has-the-u-s-just-sold-out-the-kurds/
http://diepresse.com/home/politik/aussenpolitik/4785757/Analyse_Warum-Erdogan-die-PKK-angreift?_vl_backlink=%2Fhome%2Findex.do (in German)
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/31/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-kurds-idUSKCN0Q52OH20150731

Russian soldiers in Ukraine?

Ever since the end of the Second World War, most armed conflicts have been non-international in character, with major powers often being involved indirectly by providing funds, weapons, training, and similar assistance to local forces. We have seen this pattern in Syria and, so it seemed, in Eastern Ukraine. To frame it in legal terms: States use indirect force (which is of course also covered by the prohibition of the use of force, cf the good old Nicaragua judgment), but refrain from direct force, i.e. sending their own troops. However, concerning Ukraine, the New York Times reported on the direct involvement Russian special forces in Eastern Ukraine as early as April 2014:
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/21/world/europe/photos-link-masked-men-in-east-ukraine-to-russia.html?_r=0

Prompted by these reports, VICE News tried to find the soldier shown on the picture and proving that the allegations were not correct, at least not in the sense as described by the New York Times:

On the diplomatic plane, allegations indicating direct involvement in the sense of Russian soldiers themselves being present were voiced by France during Security Council Meeting 7165 from 29 April 2014:

We are witnessing a a subversive operation that has been planned, barely disguised and orchestrated by Russia. Russian special forces do not even hide anymore. Some time ago, our Russian colleague denied their involvement in Crimea, while his President recognized it a few days later. No doubt, he will do the same with respect to current events in Ukraine. France strongly and unequivocally condemns those unacceptable attempts by Russia to destabilize Ukraine.

However, Russia has consistently denied at least direct involvement in the sense of sending its own troops to Ukraine at the same Security Meeting for instance (and throwing a verbal punch at the US and its large number of military bases abroad):

With regard to armed forces, our armed forces are on Russian territory. American forces are hardly at home. They are in Australia, Lithuania, Poland and on the Black Sea, where an American vessel has remained longer than it was invited to do. Yes, our troops do conduct training exercises. But they do so in a transparent manner and while upholding all existing international agreements. We do not have any aggressive intentions towards Ukraine. They Kyiv Government should keep a cool head and not engage in reckless activities with respect to the people in the south-east of the country, where there are many Russian citizens as well.

While Russia hasn't changed its official position until fairly recently at least (see http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/putin-denies-russian-troops-are-in-ukraine-decrees-certain-deaths-secret/2015/05/28/9bb15092-0543-11e5-93f4-f24d4af7f97d_story.html), it seems to become harder to maintain every day. As a recent video by VICE News shows, everyone with a computer can determine that it seems very likely that Russian soldiers are present on Ukrainian territory. After all, they themselves, while not wearing official insignia, seem to have posted revealing pictures on Russian social network sites. Web 2.0 indeed does have some strange side effects.