Chevron and the media

always remember to stay skeptical when it comes to media consumption. In this sense, I would like to thank Chevron for publicly sponsoring the Foreign Policy magazine.

ExxonMobil and Chevron are among the many oil and gas firms large and small drilling in Kurdistan under contracts that compensate the companies for their political risk-taking with unusually favorable terms. (Chevron said last week that it is pulling some expatriates out of Kurdistan; ExxonMobil declined to comment.) With those oil giants have come the usual contractors, the oilfield service companies, the accountants, the construction firms, the trucking firms, and, at the bottom of the economic chain, diverse entrepreneurs digging for a score.

http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/oil-erbil  

Der Krieg gegen den Islamischen Staat: Postheroismus und die Terroristen von morgen

Seit über einem Jahr fliegen zahlreiche Staaten Luftangriffe gegen die im Irak und Syrien gelegenen Stellungen des „Islamischen Staats“. Die bisherigen Erfolge sind relativ bescheiden. Darüber hinaus treffen die Angriffe zahlreiche Unschuldige, womit die Saat für die Terroristen von morgen gestreut werden könnte. Der Einsatz von Bodentruppen wird aufgrund der damit einhergehenden Gefahren für die eigenen Soldaten indes nach wie vor ausgeschlossen. Die langfristigen Auswirkungen sind nicht absehbar.

Das neue Kriegsbild

Der Krieg hat sich in den letzten Jahrzehnten stark gewandelt. Das allen voran durch die Schriften des preußischen Generals und Militärtheoretiker geprägte Bild von staatlichen Massenarmeen, die sich auf einem Schlachtfeld gegenüberstehen, hat keine Gültigkeit mehr. Die Kriege unserer Zeit werden von irregulären, oftmals nicht einmal uniformierten Kombattanten mit einfach zu bedienenden und leicht verfügbaren Waffen – symbolisiert durch die AK-47 – geführt. Sofern sie nicht ausschließlich einander bekämpfen – wie etwa in Somalia – stehen sie staatlichen Armeen mit oftmals veralteten Gerätschaften gegenüber, die ursprünglich für die Konfrontation mit anderen Staaten ausgebildet wurden. Daher geraten Zivilisten unvermeidlich ins Visier – oft werden sie etwa sie als „menschliche Schutzschilder“ missbraucht, um damit die technologische Unterlegenheit wettzumachen. Den staatlichen Streitkräften wiederum fehlt es am know how, oft aber auch am Willen, hier bestmöglich zu unterscheiden. 

Der „Kampf von Mogadischu“

In derartigen Konflikten beschränken sich Interventionen von außen in der Regel auf finanzielle Mittel, Waffenlieferungen und Ausbildungsprogramme, mitunter – zumeist allerdings erst, sobald die Lage einigermaßen beruhigt ist – auch auf Friedenstruppen der Vereinten Nationen. Ein darüber hinausgehendes direktes militärisches Eingreifen ist selten und wenn, dann kommt es meistens zur Vornahme von Luftangriffen. Als historischer Hintergrund dafür gilt allgemein die „Schlacht von Mogadischu“, bei der 18 US-Soldaten im unübersichtlichen Häuserkampf auf den Dächern und in den Straßen der somalischen Hauptstadt ums Leben kamen. Die symbolträchtigen Bilder vom wütenden Mob, der die geschändeten Leichen jubelnd durch die Straßen schleift – die US-Soldaten waren aufgrund vorangegangener Angriffe, die auch zahlreiche unschuldige Opfer gefordert hatten, bei weiten Teilen der Bevölkerung in Ungnade gefallen – gingen um die Welt und erhöhten letztlich den innenpolitischen Druck, die US-Truppen schnellstmöglich wieder abzuziehen. Mogadischu hatte gezeigt, dass die USA zwar nicht militärisch, wohl aber über ihr sensibles Rückgrat – die Zivilbevölkerung – verwundbar sind. 

Luftangriffe als „Risiko-Transfers“

Auch wenn die Erfahrungen aus Mogadischu etwa dazu führten, dass die USA wenige Monate später nicht gewillt waren, vor beziehungsweise während dem Völkermord in Ruanda einzugreifen, führten sie zu keinem strikten Non-Interventionismus. Das Dilemma, einerseits handeln und andererseits keine Verluste in den eigenen Reihen hinnehmen zu wollen, verlagerte Militäroperationen endgültig in den Luftraum. So führten die Kampfhandlungen im Zuge der Luftangriffe gegen Serbien aufgrund des Kosovo-Konflikts zu keinen Verlusten auf Seiten der NATO. Die einzigen offiziellen Opfer resultierten aus nicht mit diesen unmittelbar zusammenhängenden Helikopterabstürzen.

Der Preis dafür war jedoch hoch. Schließlich mussten die NATO-Bomber außerhalb der Reichweite der serbischen Fliegerabwehrsysteme fliegen, mit entsprechenden Folgen für die Präzision der Angriffe. Mit anderen Worten: In gewisser Hinsicht wurden die Leben der NATO-Piloten mit jenen allfälliger unschuldiger Zivilisten gegengerechnet, die Gefahren der Kriegsführung also der Zivilbevölkerung des Feindes aufgebürdet. Der Kriegssoziologe Martin Shaw bezeichnet dieses Vorgehen als „Risikotransfer-Militarismus“.

Das Muster der Kosovo-Intervention sollte sich 2011 bei der NATO-Operation in Libyen und nun im Zusammenhang mit den Angriffen auf die Stellungen des „Islamischen Staats“ wiederholen. Doch während al-Gaddafis Armee und andere ihm zugehörige Einrichtungen ein leichtes und klar umrissenes Ziel darstellten, scheinen die Angriffe gegen den „Islamischen Staat“ weniger wirksam zu sein. Forderungen nach Bodentruppen sind allerdings aus den genannten Gründen bislang verhallt, man verlässt sich vor allem auf kurdische Kämpfer, die wiederum Erdogans Türkei ein Dorn im Auge sind und die daher nur begrenzt unterstützt werden können, und die „moderaten Rebellen“ (eine freilich fragwürdige Einstufung). Effektiv ist das nicht, US-Präsident Barack Obama räumte auch bereits ein, dass der Kampf gegen den „Islamischen Staat“ eine Weile andauern werde. Selbst wenn seine in Syrien und im Irak gelegenen Stellungen eines Tages tatsächlich von der Landkarte verschwunden sein dürften, nistet er sich mit jedem zusätzlichen zivilen Opfer der Luftangriffe tiefer in den Köpfen seiner Sympathisanten – die auch in Europa und den USA leben – und der unmittelbar Betroffenen ein. Dementsprechend birgt das momentane Vorgehen auf lange Sicht ein enormes Risiko.

The West's role in the rise of the Islamic State

two powerful essays on this delicate topic; to put it in most basic terms: The US (and its allies Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Quatar) supported "moderate" opposition groups in their quest to overthrow Assad and ultimately it turned out that many of those where not as moderate at as they had thought.

http://www.thenation.com/article/how-war-terror-created-worlds-most-powerful-terror-group/

http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jun/03/us-isis-syria-iraq

Turkey's legal justification for its recent attacks against the Kurds and ISIS/ISIL

first and foremost, the official notification by Turkey concerning its attacks against ISIS/ISIL in Syria can be found here: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2015_563.pdf 

Similar to the US and its allies, Turkey relies on the right to self-defence and, more specifically, the "unwilling or unable"-doctrine, as the legal basis for striking against ISIS/ISIL inside Syria. Most interestingly, however, the letter to the Security Council does not refer to the threat emanating from Kurdish fighters but only ISIS/ISIL (Daesh):

The terrorist attack that took the lives of 32 Turkish citizens in Suruç on 20 July 2015 reaffirms that Turkey is under a clear and imminent threat of continuing attack from Daesh. Most recently, on 23 July 2015, Daesh attacked the border military post in Elbeyli and killed a Turkish soldier.
It is apparent that the regime in Syria is neither capable of nor willing to prevent these threats emanating from its territory, which clearly imperil the security of Turkey and the safety of its nationals.
Individual and collective self-defence is our inherent right under international law, as reflected in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.
On this basis, Turkey has initiated necessary and proportionate military actions against Daesh in Syria, including in coordination with individual members of the Global Coalition, in order to counter the terrorist threat and to safeguard its territory and citizens.

The legal basis for its military strikes against Iraq, then, is the consent given by the Iraqi government:
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-220_-31-july-2015_-press-release-regarding-the-statement-of-the-iraqi-government-about-turkey_s-operations-towards-the-pkk-targets.en.mfa:

His Excellency called on the Turkish government to coordinate with the Iraqi government about any military operation in those areas, stressing Iraq's keenness on Turkey's internal security and its people's safety, praising the Turkish decision which allowed the use of its airbases by the international coalition to attack the terrorist Daesh organization. 

Regarding the attacks against Kurdish fighters located in Iraq, however, the Iraqi government has voiced harsh criticism which comes close to a (partial) withdrawal of its consent, or at least a threat of doing so, denouncing these as "a dangerous escalation and an assault on Iraqi sovereignty" and calling on Turkey to avoid further escalation and seek a resolution to the crisis.

As a reaction, Turkey has stated that Iraq was not fulfilling its duty to prevent any attacks/not to harbor such "terrorists". All in all, it seems as if Turkey is stretching the Iraqi acceptance to conduct attacks against ISIS/ISIL and the Kurds on its territory quite far; however, as long as Iraq does not expliticitly withdraw its consent, there is a legal basis for the Turkish attack:

[...] the negative attitude adopted by the Iraqi Government regarding the steps taken by Turkey within the framework of international of law towards the terrorist attacks faced by our country and the operations conducted by Turkey, in this context, against the PKK terrorist organization located within the borders of Iraq has caused disappointment.

Although the Iraqi Government emphasizes its commitment for not allowing any attack towards Turkey from the Iraqi territories, it is clear that this commitment has not been fulfilled and numerous armed PKK militants have continued to harbor in the Iraqi territory for years. Therefore it is not possible to comprehend or accept that those, who cannot fulfill their commitments, do not have the possibility to keep their borders under control, and one-third of whose territories are under the control of the terrorist organization, have taken a stance against Turkey in its fight against the PKK terrorist organization perpetrating armed attacks towards its citizens and security forces.

That being said, although there is indeed a (somewhat shaky) legal justification – in line with those which have been invoked by other states in attacking ISIS/ISIL in the past, the problem is that Turkey does not restrict its attacks against this group. It is obvious that the balance between striking against ISIS/ISIL and, simultaneously, against the Kurds, the most reliable allies of the West and the US in particular, will cause political and, relatedly, perhaps also legal problems in the near future. Until now, however, Iraq would only withdraw or expliticly restrict its consent for military strikes by Turkey if the US allows it to do so (which seems highly unlikely for the time being).

Here are also a few good articles on the Syria/Iraq/ISIS/ISIL/Kurds-quagmire:

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33747980 (scroll down for some helpful infographics)
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/31/turkey-goes-to-war-syria-rebels/
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/turkey-conflict-with-kurds-was-approving-air-strikes-against-the-pkk-americas-worst-error-in-the-middle-east-since-the-iraq-war-10417381.html
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/29/whats-behind-turkeys-u-turn-on-the-islamic-state-kurds-syria/
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/28/has-the-u-s-just-sold-out-the-kurds/
http://diepresse.com/home/politik/aussenpolitik/4785757/Analyse_Warum-Erdogan-die-PKK-angreift?_vl_backlink=%2Fhome%2Findex.do (in German)
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/31/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-kurds-idUSKCN0Q52OH20150731

the disturbing UN report on the crimes of the "Islamic State"/ISIS/IS/Desh

including the possibility of genocide. The report can be found here. Nothing more to add, it speaks for itself:


17. Based on interviews conducted with victims and witnesses, and corroborated by other sources, the mission collected information regarding the killing of members of the Yezidi community and acts that caused serious bodily or mental harm to members of this group. Information also pointed to the intent of ISIL to destroy the Yezidi as a group when perpetrating these acts and to the existence of a manifest pattern of attacks against this community whose identity is based on their religious beliefs. If confirmed, such conduct may amount to genocide. Numerous Yezidi witnesses provided credible and consistent accounts, involving separate incidents and attacks, detailing how they were forced to convert to Islam or face death.

18. At the beginning of August 2014, a series of systematic and widespread attacks took place against a backdrop of ISIL incursions into the Ninewa plains and Yezidi populated cities and villages. Interviews with numerous victims and witnesses from al-‘Adnaniya, al-Qahtaniya, Barah, Bazwaya, Dogore, Gogjali, Hardan, Khanasor, Kocho, Qani, Sharf ad-Din, Sinjar city, Solagh, Tel Banat, Tel Qasab and Zummar point to a pattern, whereby members of ISIL systematically separated the men from the women and young children; the men were subsequently taken away to nearby ditches and summarily executed. Some victims and witnesses added that they had been asked to convert to Islam and that the men who refused were killed, while in other instances even the men who converted were still summarily executed. Men who managed to survive such executions, largely through being shielded by the bodies of other victims, relayed their accounts to the investigation team. Women and children who were held captive near execution sites also witnessed some executions. In some instances, villages were entirely emptied of their Yezidi population.

19. For instance, on 3 August, in Qani village (Sinjar) at least 80 men were killed in a single incident. The mission interviewed survivors. One of them recounted how they were rounded up and taken to a nearby ditch where ISIL opened fire on them. He added that at least 50 members of his extended family were killed. In Kocho, at least 700 men were killed in August. A survivor of one of the several Kocho village (Sinjar) massacres recounted that around 11 August, Yezidi men who refused to covert were separated from the women and then taken to a farm. An ISIL fighter told them ‘you will see now what will happen to you, you pagans and peacock worshippers’. Although the villagers were initially given assurances that they would be freed once they handed over their possessions, ISIL divided the men in four groups of 15, and took them to a farm on the outskirts of Kocho village. The Yezidi men were ordered to lay down facing the ground; they were filmed by ISIL fighters before being shot several times. Survivors informed the mission that some residents from surrounding areas assisted ISIL in perpetrating such killings. Witnesses consistently reported that ISIL fighters acted upon direct orders they received via telephone.

20. ISIL fighters abducted Yezidis on a mass scale, and detained many for months. For instance, a group of 196 disabled Yezidis, including elderly, children and ill persons were held captive in Mosul and Tel Afar and only released in January 2015. Many victims were forced to convert to Islam during their captivity. Around 3,000 persons, mainly Yezidis, allegedly remain in ISIL captivity. Further investigation is needed to establish the precise number of those who continue to be held by ISIL as well as the numbers killed, estimated to be in the thousands.

37. Girls and unmarried women who escaped from ISIL captivity consistently recounted the process by which they were raped and sexually enslaved. ISIL members numbered them or recorded names on lists, and inspected them to evaluate their beauty. While some were given as ‘gifts,’ others were sold to local or foreign ISIL fighters. Some victims were privy to price negotiations between ‘vendors’ and ‘buyers.’ An ‘emir’10 would instruct ISIL fighters to inspect and choose girls for ‘marriage.’ Girls would then be prepared for ‘marriage’ (rape) involving, in some cases, full body searches. Mission investigators met with victims as young as 11 years of age.11 A 30 year-old woman detailed how young girls were prepared for sale at a house in Mosul. They were ordered to stand and remove their headscarves to be inspected. Then they were forced to smile while ISIL fighters took photographs.

38. A victim witnessed similar cruel and inhuman treatment following her transfer to Adnaani, a 15-minute drive from Ba’aj, Ninewa governorate. She recounted that an ‘emir’ wrote the names of 14 girls on small pieces of paper and called two ISIL fighters who both picked one piece of paper. The ‘emir’ asked the ISIL fighters to call out the name written on the paper. The 15 and 18 year old girls whose names were called were forcibly taken by the two fighters into another room. The ‘emir’ and a so-called ‘Imam’ who was in the room laughed when they heard the two girls screaming. After around 20 minutes, the two girls were brought back into the room. The witness said both girls were in shock and had blood on their trousers. Both confirmed to the witness that they had been ‘married’ (raped).

39. A 19-year-old pregnant married woman explained that she was repeatedly raped by an ISIL ‘doctor’ for two and a half months in Hawija District, Kirkuk governorate.12 There were visible lacerations on her breast, indicating she may have been tortured. According to the woman, the doctor sat on her stomach, aiming to kill her unborn child, saying, “this baby should die because it is an infidel; I can make a Muslim baby.”

40. The mission obtained credible reports about the rape of young girls, including nine and six year-olds. The former was raped for three days by an ISIL fighter in Tel Qaseb, Ninewa governorate. A witness stated that she could clearly hear the girl being assaulted and screaming out her name for help. The girl told the witness that she was blindfolded, handcuffed, beaten and repeatedly raped. Eventually, her ‘owner’ sold her to another ISIL fighter from Syria. In the same house, a six year-old girl was raped by another ISIL fighter. A witness heard the child screaming.13 She was reportedly sold to an ISIL fighter in Syria.

41. Witnesses reported that a doctor conducted abortions on two women in a school in Ba’aj, Ninewa, who were two and three months pregnant, respectively. Prior to the abortion, one witness reportedly heard an ISIL fighter stating: “we do not want more Yezidis to be born.” Both women received an injection and were made to take pills. A week after the abortion, both women were sold.
42. Women who escaped ISIL custody recounted how they were forcibly transferred multiple times to different locations, including Adnaani, al-Nufus, Ba’aj, Fallujah, Gayara, Hawija, Khaini, Kirkuk, Kocho, Mosul,14 Rambosi, Sheba, Solagh, Tel Afar,15 Tel Qaseb, Tel Banat and Wardya in Iraq. Other women and children were transferred to al-Hassakeh, al-Shadadiyah, Deir-ez-Zoor, Ghazna, Membij, Raqqa and Tel Abyad in Syria.

43. Many survivors of sexual violence experienced the loss of loved ones killed by ISIL. Some witnessed these attacks and are severely traumatised. Suicides and attempted suicides have sharply risen amongst these women and girls. Many survivors interviewed displayed visible signs of trauma and depression. The mission spoke to men who were desperate and felt helpless being separated from their wives and children. One stated: “losing my wife and children to ISIL is the worst nightmare that could happen to a man.”