Is the Islamic State a State (in the sense of international law)?

Is the Islamic State a State?

Ralph Janik is a Researcher at the University of Vienna, Faculty of Law. His research focuses on the use of force and history and theory of international law.

Ever since the so-called Islamic state managed to capture significant parts of Iraqi territory, it has triggered a wave of academic commentary, in particular on the right to self-defence against non-state armed groups. It is thus generally not seen a state in the sense of (international) law. Little agreement exists on the grounds upon which this characterisation is denied, however – rather, it seems that this question has been taken for granted. Since it can be said that entities like the Islamic State ultimately challenge the traditional thinking on statehood and a few words on its legal personality are thus warranted.

Statehood in International Law

There are numerous ways by which the Islamic State’s statehood can be contested. Two of them seem to stand out. On the one hand, one could doubt whether the criteria listed in the 1933 Montevideo Convention, i.e.

(a)    a permanent population

(b)   a defined territory

(c)    a government and

(d)   the capacity to enter into relations with other states

are present in the case of the Islamic State. On the other hand, one could simply argue that it is not recognized by any state and that Security Council has even passed a resolution (2249) calling for the eradication of its save haven in Iraq and Syria. The international community has thus also taken decisive steps to prevent the Islamic State from coming into existence as a legal entity.

In my view, the latter option is to be preferred. Given the flexibility often used in the establishment of states, an advocatus diaboli could certainly argue that the Islamic State fulfils all of these criteria.

While the people living under its rule are sometimes described as quasi-hostages (one needs to mention the gross human rights abuses committed against minorities here; a UN report even spoke of genocide against the Yezidis here), it seems to enjoy a certain level of support among the Sunni majority for maintaining law and order (see also here). It must also not be forgotten that the current alternatives – the Shia-dominated government in Iraq and the Kurds – are highly unpopular. In any case, the requirement of a permanent population does not allow for a restrictive interpretation since the colonization process has ultimately led to the establishment of a great number of states populated by people without a far-reaching sense of unity or solidarity.

The requirement of a defined territory does, as the examples of Albania’s admission to the League of Nations in 1920 or Israel’s membership in the UN show, not necessarily require universally accepted borders but merely control over a certain key area. The Islamic State has, despite its significant territorial losses in Iraq, managed to hold onto its safe haven in Syria. The remaining question is whether it lacks permanence. In this regard, it must not be forgotten that many states were recognized immediately after their declaration of independence during the de-colonisation period. In addition, US president Barack Obama has already made it clear that the fight against the Islamic State will take time, while the Islamic State’s declaration of the restoration of the Caliphate goes back to June 2014.

What is clear is that the Islamic State constitutes a government as required by the Montevideo Convention. It is independent from other states and fulfils all those functions usually associated with a state. A documentary by VICE News shows a prison system, authorities doing their daily work, or police officers patrolling the streets. It also entertains social-welfare programs and even claims to issue its own gold coins in an attempt to bring back the gold standard.

The capacity to enter into relations with other states, then, is often seen as a mere consequence of the first three criteria. Others contend that a minimum degree of acceptance by other states is required (see below).

What role for recognition?

Other factors such as a certain degree of civilization, minimal respect for human rights, or the willingness to adhere to international law (the latter was recently mentioned by Martti Koskenniemi) are not elements of statehood but rather play a role when determining whether to recognize an entity as a state. This leads us directly to the good old doctrinal debate between the declaratory theory and the constitutive theory.

Radical proponents of the declaratory theory have a hard time rejecting the Islamic State’s character as a state. The declaratory theory ultimately means that even the most tyrannical regime can constitute a state regardless of whether it is recognized or not as soon as it fulfils the three criteria of statehood – all that matters it is effectiveness.

Even if one could successfully argues that it does not have a territory or a population, such a restrictive application of these criteria runs counter to many historical examples and thus seems somewhat arbitrary. From a strictly legal perspective, it is generally hard to argue in favour of applying the statehood-requirements differently depending on the political circumstances. One possible solution is to require a higher standard of governance than mere effective control, i.e. that usually associated with the notion of good governance, in all cases. The remaining problem would be the question why this standard is applied in connection with newly emerging states only and not with long-established ones as well.

Hard cases like that of the Islamic State thus ultimately highlight the lasting importance of recognition. At the same time, a strict application of the declaratory theory is to be rejected, first and foremost since – absent universal recognition – one and the same entity could simultaneously constitute a state in the eyes of some and a non-state in the eyes of others.

A third view tries to walk a middle path between these two theories (e.g. suggested by John Dugard, see The Secession of States and Their Recognition in the Wake of Kosovo) by qualifying the capacity to enter into relations with other states is seen as an additional (fourth) element of statehood. A widely isolated entity with a permanent population, a certain territory, and a government would thus not be classified as a state. On the other hand, any entity may enjoy objective statehood (i.e. also towards non-recognizing states) if it is recognized by a certain number of states (the exact number is obviously difficult to determine). The status of existing states, even although many of them fall short of good governance, is thus not affected. In theory, tyrannical regimes could also achieve statehood. In practice, however, criteria like the rule of law, observance of human rights, or a certain degree of representativeness – are usually taken into account when new states come into existence. Hence, the Islamic State neither currently constitutes a state nor would it be able to achieve statehood and all of the associated privileges in the future.

does the Islamic State have a population in the sense of the statehood criteria?

Is the "Islamic State" a state in the sense of international law? After all, two out of the three classical criteria for statehood can be said to be fulfilled as it has been controlling a considerable portion of territory for quite some time now and it seems to be functioning better than some well-established states. The main question (leaving the old doctrinal debate on recognition aside) is whether it has a permanent population.
Some try to portray it as as an alien force composed of countless foreign soldiers and thus somewhat acting against the will of those living under its reign. That, however, seems to be only part of the story. After all, an insightful VICE documentary on the Islamic State from a couple of months ago reveals that it guarantees one thing people yearn during times of war: Stability and security. This finding is further supported by a more recent VICE documentary on people living in territory re-captured from the Islamic State by Kurdish Peshmerga forces. As one of the men there says, "May God save the Islamic State. [...] the Islamic State has discipline". From this perspective, it could certainly be argued that the Islamic State also has a permanent population. After all, we must not forget the countless former colonies lacking a sense of common identity, nationhood, unity, or trust into their government.

Turkey's legal justification for its recent attacks against the Kurds and ISIS/ISIL

first and foremost, the official notification by Turkey concerning its attacks against ISIS/ISIL in Syria can be found here: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2015_563.pdf 

Similar to the US and its allies, Turkey relies on the right to self-defence and, more specifically, the "unwilling or unable"-doctrine, as the legal basis for striking against ISIS/ISIL inside Syria. Most interestingly, however, the letter to the Security Council does not refer to the threat emanating from Kurdish fighters but only ISIS/ISIL (Daesh):

The terrorist attack that took the lives of 32 Turkish citizens in Suruç on 20 July 2015 reaffirms that Turkey is under a clear and imminent threat of continuing attack from Daesh. Most recently, on 23 July 2015, Daesh attacked the border military post in Elbeyli and killed a Turkish soldier.
It is apparent that the regime in Syria is neither capable of nor willing to prevent these threats emanating from its territory, which clearly imperil the security of Turkey and the safety of its nationals.
Individual and collective self-defence is our inherent right under international law, as reflected in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.
On this basis, Turkey has initiated necessary and proportionate military actions against Daesh in Syria, including in coordination with individual members of the Global Coalition, in order to counter the terrorist threat and to safeguard its territory and citizens.

The legal basis for its military strikes against Iraq, then, is the consent given by the Iraqi government:
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-220_-31-july-2015_-press-release-regarding-the-statement-of-the-iraqi-government-about-turkey_s-operations-towards-the-pkk-targets.en.mfa:

His Excellency called on the Turkish government to coordinate with the Iraqi government about any military operation in those areas, stressing Iraq's keenness on Turkey's internal security and its people's safety, praising the Turkish decision which allowed the use of its airbases by the international coalition to attack the terrorist Daesh organization. 

Regarding the attacks against Kurdish fighters located in Iraq, however, the Iraqi government has voiced harsh criticism which comes close to a (partial) withdrawal of its consent, or at least a threat of doing so, denouncing these as "a dangerous escalation and an assault on Iraqi sovereignty" and calling on Turkey to avoid further escalation and seek a resolution to the crisis.

As a reaction, Turkey has stated that Iraq was not fulfilling its duty to prevent any attacks/not to harbor such "terrorists". All in all, it seems as if Turkey is stretching the Iraqi acceptance to conduct attacks against ISIS/ISIL and the Kurds on its territory quite far; however, as long as Iraq does not expliticitly withdraw its consent, there is a legal basis for the Turkish attack:

[...] the negative attitude adopted by the Iraqi Government regarding the steps taken by Turkey within the framework of international of law towards the terrorist attacks faced by our country and the operations conducted by Turkey, in this context, against the PKK terrorist organization located within the borders of Iraq has caused disappointment.

Although the Iraqi Government emphasizes its commitment for not allowing any attack towards Turkey from the Iraqi territories, it is clear that this commitment has not been fulfilled and numerous armed PKK militants have continued to harbor in the Iraqi territory for years. Therefore it is not possible to comprehend or accept that those, who cannot fulfill their commitments, do not have the possibility to keep their borders under control, and one-third of whose territories are under the control of the terrorist organization, have taken a stance against Turkey in its fight against the PKK terrorist organization perpetrating armed attacks towards its citizens and security forces.

That being said, although there is indeed a (somewhat shaky) legal justification – in line with those which have been invoked by other states in attacking ISIS/ISIL in the past, the problem is that Turkey does not restrict its attacks against this group. It is obvious that the balance between striking against ISIS/ISIL and, simultaneously, against the Kurds, the most reliable allies of the West and the US in particular, will cause political and, relatedly, perhaps also legal problems in the near future. Until now, however, Iraq would only withdraw or expliticly restrict its consent for military strikes by Turkey if the US allows it to do so (which seems highly unlikely for the time being).

Here are also a few good articles on the Syria/Iraq/ISIS/ISIL/Kurds-quagmire:

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33747980 (scroll down for some helpful infographics)
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/31/turkey-goes-to-war-syria-rebels/
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/turkey-conflict-with-kurds-was-approving-air-strikes-against-the-pkk-americas-worst-error-in-the-middle-east-since-the-iraq-war-10417381.html
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/29/whats-behind-turkeys-u-turn-on-the-islamic-state-kurds-syria/
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/28/has-the-u-s-just-sold-out-the-kurds/
http://diepresse.com/home/politik/aussenpolitik/4785757/Analyse_Warum-Erdogan-die-PKK-angreift?_vl_backlink=%2Fhome%2Findex.do (in German)
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/31/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-kurds-idUSKCN0Q52OH20150731

zum Völkerrechtssubjekt "Deutsches Reich"

Derzeit kursiert online (unter anderem aufgrund eines von Anonymous geposteten Statusupdates dazu, siehe https://www.facebook.com/Anonymous.Kollektiv/posts/934174103295717:0) ein wenig Aufregung hinsichtlich der Völkerrechtssubjektivität des deutschen Reichs; Grund ist eine Anfrage der Linken, man lese selbst:

Völkerrechtssubjekt "Deutsches Reich"

Auswärtiges/Antwort - 30.06.2015

Berlin: (hib/AHE) Das Bundesverfassungsgericht hat in ständiger Rechtsprechung festgestellt, dass das Völkerrechtssubjekt "Deutsches Reich" nicht untergegangen und die Bundesrepublik Deutschland nicht sein Rechtsnachfolger, sondern mit ihm als Völkerrechtssubjekt identisch ist. Darauf verweist die Bundesregierung in ihrer Antwort (18/5178) auf eine Kleine Anfrage der Fraktion Die Linke zum Potsdamer Abkommen von 1945 (18/5033). Die Abgeordneten hatten sich unter anderem nach der "These von der Fortexistenz des Deutschen Reiches" erkundigt und gefragt, ob die Bundesregierung diese als öffentlich als unhaltbar zurückweisen werde, "damit diese Behauptung nicht von Neonazis und der so genannten Reichsbürgerbewegung für ihren Gebietsrevisionismus gegenüber den EU-Nachbarländern instrumentalisiert werden kann". 

https://www.bundestag.de/presse/hib/2015_06/-/380964
http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/051/1805178.pdf
http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/050/1805033.pdf

 Einmal mehr wird eine alte und eigentlich lediglich (rechts-)historische völkerrechtliche Debatte aus politischen Gründen neu aufgewärmt. Die Frage des Untergangs des Deutschen Reichs stellte sich schließlich unmittelbar nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg und der Übernahme der Regierungsgewalt (in der Berliner Erklärung) durch die vier Siegermächte, das Ende der Besatzung und die Teilung Deutschlands. Der später von der DDR vertretenen Debellationstheorie zufolge war Deutschland nach der Kapitulation beziehungsweise spätestens aufgrund der Berliner Erklärung, untergegangen. Andere vertraten die Ansicht, dass Deutschland in zwei neue Staaten zerfallen (Dismembration) und daher untergegangen war.
Die BRD (und anfangs auch die DDR) vertrat jedenfalls stets jeweils die Ansicht, dass Deutschland als Völkerrechtssubjekt weiter fortbestand (für Näheres vgl etwa Kay Hailbronner/Marcel Kau, 'Der Staat und der Einzelne als Völkerrechtssubjekte' in: Wolfgang Graf Vitzthum (Hrsg.), Völkerrecht (5. Auflage, de Gruyter 2010),147, 222).
Aus der damaligen, also zeitnahen Lehre seien an dieser Stelle ein Beitrag von Hans Kelsen ('Is a Peace Treaty with Germany legally possible and politically desirable?' (1947) 41/6 The American Political Science Review 1188), in dem er den Untergang des Deutschen Reichs postulierte, und zwei in die Gegenrichtung argumentierende Artikel aus dem Jahr 1951 hier ausführlicher zitiert.

 By its complete defeat, the surrender of its armed force, and the abolishment
of its national government, Germany has ceased to exist as a sovereign
state and subject of international law.' By the Declaration of Berlin,
June 5, 1945, the four Powers occupying the country-the United States
of America, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the French
Republic assumed "supreme authority with respect to Germany including
all powers possessed by the German Government, the High Command,
and any state, municipal, or local government or authority." This meant
that the four occupant Powers have assumed sovereignty over the former
German territory and its population, though the term "sovereignty" was
not used in the text of the Declaration. The four occupant Powers exercise
their joint sovereignty through the Control Council, established at Berlin
as the legitimate successor of the last national government of Germany.
All this is in complete conformity with general international law, which
authorizes a victorious state, after so-called debellatio of its opponent, to
establish its own sovereignty over the territory and population of the subjugated state. Debellatioim pliesa utomatict ermination of the state of war. Hence, a peace treaty with Germany is legally not possible. [...]

According to international law, a community is a state if, and as long as, a certain  population is living on a definite territory under an independent government. If one of these three essential elementsof a state in the sense of international law is missing, the state as a subject of international law disappears, or, in other words, the community ceases to exist as a sovereign state. No state can exercise the sovereignty of another state. State sovereignty does not permit representation or substitution.

Vor allem der letzte Absatz, demzufolge ein Staat untergeht, wenn eines der drei Elemente (Staatsgebiet, Staatsvolk, Staatsgewalt) verlorengeht, ist aus heutiger Sicht so nicht mehr haltbar; sogenannte failed states etwa, also Staaten ohne effektiver Zentralgewalt, existieren völkerrechtlich weiter fort.

Gegen Kelsens These vom Untergang Deutschlands im völkerrechtlichen Sinne wandte sich Alfred Verdross, ein Schüler Kelsens (und Professor an der Universität Wien), der die Debellationstheorie mit den folgenden Worten entkräftete:

Außer Streit steht aber auch, daß die Siegermächte Deutschland n i c h t endgültig aufgeteilt und n i c h t ihren Staatsgebieten einverleibt, sondern wiederholt ihren Willen zum Ausdruck gebracht haben, in einem späteren Zeitpunkt mit Deutschland einen Friedensvertrag abzuschließen und die deutsche Souveränität wieder herzustellen.
Aus diesem scheinbaren Widerspruch zwischen der Übernahme der
obersten Gewalt durch die Siegermächte einerseits und der Ablehnung
der Annexion des deutschen Gebietes durch dieselben Mächte andererseits
entzünden sich die gegensätzlichen Theorien. Die eine stützt sich
auf das erstgenannte Faktum und behauptet, daß das Völkerrechtssubjekt
"Deutsches Reich" durch D e b e l l a t i o n untergegangen sei. Darunter
versteht man in der Regel die vollständige Vernichtung der Staatsgewalt
des besiegten Staates, welche nach der herrschenden Lehre den
Staatsuntergang bewirkt. Dabei wird aber vor allem übersehen, daß
Deutschland gar nicht debelliert wurde, wenn man darunter die v o l l s t ä n d i g e   Zerstörung der Staatsgewalt des besetzten Staates versteht.
Vielmehr haben a l l e l o k a l e n O r g a n e (Gerichts- und Verwaltungsbehörden) ununterbrochen nach deutschem Recht weiterfunktioniert. Gewiß wurden diese Organe der Befehlsgewalt der Okkupationsmächte unterstellt und angewiesen, teilweise auch neue, von diesen Mächten erlassene Anordnungen anzuwenden. Das ist aber bei j e d e r
kriegerischen Okkupation der Fall, da diese ja w e s e n s m ä ß i g darin
besteht, daß die Organisation des besetzten Staates gleichsam enthauptet
und unter die Befehlsgewalt des Okkupanten gestellt wird (Art. 43 der
Haager Landkriegsordnung). Dadurch wird aber die Behauptung von
Kunz, daß ein Staat nicht nur untere Organe haben könne, widerlegt.
Gewiß ist das normalerweise nicht der Fall. Bei einer vollständigen
„occupatio bellica", wird aber immer die souveräne Gewalt des besetzten
Staates durch die Gewalt des Okkupanten vorübergehend ausgeschaltet.
Das bedeutet aber 'keineswegs, daß der Okkupant die souveräne Gewalt des besetzten Staates ausübt, sondern er übt im besetzten Gebiete seine
e i g e n e Gewalt aus. Diese zerstört aber nicht die Staatsgewalt des
besetzten Staates, sondern sie schaltet nur ihre oberste Schicht vorübergehend
aus. Daher kann man sagen, daß die souveräne Gewalt des besetzten
Staates für die Dauer der Besetzung r u h t , mit der Aufhebung
der kriegerischen Besetzung aber a u t o m a t i s c h wieder auflebt.
Selbst wenn man aber annimmt, daß Deutschland debelliert wurde, so
wäre damit nichts für die Untergangstheorie gewonnen, da es keine
Völkerrechtsnorm gibt, welche an die Zerstörung der Staatsgewalt die
Rechtsfolge des Unterganges des Staates knüpft. Der Begriff „debellatio"
ist nur ein Sammelbegriff der Rechtswissenschaft und kein Tatbestand
des Völkerrechts. Aus diesem Begriffe können daher k e i n e r l e i rechtliche
Folgerungen gezogen werden. Nur tatsächlich bewirkt eine Debellation
normalerweise den Untergang des debellierten Staates, da der
Debellation n o r m a l e r w e i s e die Annexion nachfolgt.
Geht man der Debellationstheorie auf den Grund, so zeigt es sich,
daß sie von der Auffassung ausgeht, ein Staat im Sinne des Völkerrechts
erschöpfe sich in seiner O r g a n i s a t i o n , da man nur von dieser
Voraussetzung aus behaupten kann, ein Staat gehe mit der Zerstörung
seiner Organisation unter.
Diese Voraussetzung steht aber mit dem positiven Völkerrecht in
Widerspruch, da nach der ständigen Staatenpraxis keine Revolution und
kein Staatsstreich die völkerrechtliche Identität eines Staates aufheben
kann. Nur vom Standpunkt des innerstaatlichen Rechts kann man sagen,
daß ein Staat mit seiner Organisation steht und fällt. Vom Standpunkte
des Völkerrechts hingegen überlebt ein Staat a l l e A r t e n der Zerstörung
seiner Organisation.
Er bleibt völkerrechtlich solange als dasselbe Rechtssubjekt erhalten, als
das Staatsvolk keinem anderen Staate dauernd einverleibt wird. Das zeigt
uns aber, daß nicht der Staat a l s  O r g a n i s a t i o n die Völkerrechtssubjektivität besitzt, sondern das zur Staatsreife gelangte und als Staat anerkannte S t a a t s v o l k. Daher haftet das Staatsvolk völkerrechtlich weiter, auch wenn die schuldigen Staatsorgane längst gestorben sind oder wenn die alte Staatsorganisation einer neuen Platz gemacht hat. Diesen Grundsatz faßt Bynkershoek in die berühmten Worte zusammen: „Forma autem regiminis mutata, non mutatur ipse populus. Eadem utique Republica est, quamvis nunc hoc, nunc alio modo regatur".

[...]

Ein Staat bleibt aber auch dann völkerrechtlich erhalten, wenn er vorübergehend
überhaupt keine Zentralregierung besitzt, wie im Schiedsspruche
vom 3. Juni 1937 im Falle G. W. Hopkins näher dargelegt wurde.
Schließlich verliert ein Staat seine Völkerrechtssubjektivität selbst dann
nicht, wenn er im Zuge eines Krieges vollständig besetzt und dem Okkupanten       staatsrechtlich einverleibt wird, da eine solche Einverleibung
völkerrechtlich unwirksam ist. Das beweist uns aber auch, daß das
Prinzip der Effektivität kein absolutes Prinzip des Völkerrechts ist, sondern
nur in jenem Rahmen gilt, den ihm das Völkerrecht anweist. Dieses
anerkennt aber nur einen e n d g ü 1 t i g e n , d. h. mit Aussicht auf
Dauer ausgestatteten, nicht einen bloß vorübergehenden Zustand als einen
rechtsbegründenden Tatbestand, so daß die Rechtsfolge des Gebietserwerbes
niemals die Folge der bloßen Effektivität, sondern erst die
Rechtsfolge der E n d g ü 1 t i g k e i t eines Herrschaftszustandes bildet.
Der Grundsatz „ex injuria jus non oritur" wird somit von keiner Ausnahme
durchbrochen.
Aus diesen Ausführungen ergibt sich, daß die Völkerrechtssubjektivität
eines Staates weder durch innere Gewaltakte, noch durch eine fremde
Okkupation mit Annexionsabsicht, sondern nur durch eine d a u e r -
h a f t e Annexion des ganzen Staatsgebietes durch einen oder mehrere
Staaten vernichtet werden kann. Diese kann natürlich auch in der
Form vor sich gehen, daß die Siegermächte das Territorium des besiegten
Staates in ein ihnen gemeinsam gehörendes Staatengemeinschaftsgebiet
umwandeln. Insoweit ist Kelsen vollkommen im Recht. Dazu genügt
aber nicht, daß sie eine gemeine Herrschaft, also ein c o i m p e r i u m
begründen, sondern sie müssen ein c o n d o m i n i u m in der Weise
schaffen, daß sie sich das in Rede stehende Gebiet endgültig aneignen.
Dazu gehört aber außer dem „corpus" auch der „a n i m u s t e r r i -
t o r i u m s i b i h a b e n d i". Sie müssen also auch die Absicht haben,
das Territorium gemeinsam für sich zu behalten oder gegebenenfalls
später untereinander aufzuteilen. Das war aber 1945 zweifellos nicht der
Fall, da die Siegermächte einen solchen Willen niemals zum Ausdruck
gebracht, sondern von allem Anfang an die Wiederherstellung der deutschen Souveränität in Aussicht genommen haben. Daher ist das deutsche Territorium weder ein „condominium" der Okkupationsmächte, noch auch ein „territorium nullius" geworden.
Es liegt vielmehr eine o c c u p a t i o b e l l i c a vor, welche die Einstellung der Feindseligkeiten überdauert hat und bis zum Abschlusse eines Friedensvertrages andauern wird.
Diese Okkupation wird aber dadurch qualifiziert, daß das deutsche
Territorium vollständig besetzt und daher vollkommen der Gewalt der
Siegermächte unterworfen wurde. Außerdem bestand keine deutsche
Exilregierung, so daß nirgends mehr eine souveräne deutsche Staatsgewalt
vorhanden war.
Aus dieser unbestreitbaren Tatsache zieht die Debellationstheorie den
Schluß, daß das Völkerrechtssubjekt „Deutsches Reich" untergegangen
sei, da ein Staat im Sinne des Völkerrechts eine souveräne Rechtsgemeinschaft sei, weshalb ein Staat ohne Souveränität nicht bestehen könne.
Dieser Einwand ist sehr ernst. Er ist aber doch nicht durchschlagend,
wenn man einmal erkannt hat, daß nicht die Staatsorganisation, sondern
das als Staat anerkannte V o l k das Völkerrechtssubjekt bildet, wie früher
nachgewiesen wurde. [...] Schließlich müssen wir noch darauf hinweisen, daß die Untergangstheorie auch deshalb unhaltbar ist, da sie die Bildung der westdeutschen Regierung und die von ihr gesetzten Akte nur als eine von den Okkupationsmächten d e l e g i e r t e Gewalt konstruieren kann, was zur Folge hätte, daß die delegierte Gewalt zur delegierenden Gewalt in Widerspruch geraten und mit ihr über den Abschluß eines Friedensvertrages verhandeln könnte. Die Siegermächte würden also gleichsam mit sich selbst kontrahieren! In Wahrheit aber bildet die westdeutsche Regierung eine aus Wahlen hervorgegangene, autonome deutsche Regierung, wenngleich sie sich nur in dem sich schrittweise erweiternden Rahmen bewegen kann, den die Okkupationsmächte gezogen haben und obgleich sie nur in einem Teile Deutschlands eine effektive Gewalt ausübt. Eine
solche autonome Regierung setzt aber die Existenz eines deutschen
Völkerrechtssubjektes bereits voraus, in dessen Namen sie auftritt. Das
ist auch die Überzeugung aller beteiligten Staatsmänner, die keine noch
so geistvolle „Theorie" übersehen sollte.

 Alfred Verdross, Die völkerrechtliche Stellung Deutschlands von 1945 bis zur Bildung der westdeutschen Regierung (1951) 3 Archiv des Völkerrechts 129 [Fußnoten entfernt]

Ein anderer lesenswerter Beitrag aus dieser Zeit stammt von Kurt von Laun, einem damals in Hamburg tätigen deutschen Rechtsanwalt, der ebenfalls die Debellationsthese zurückwies und den völkerrechtlichen Fortbestand des Deutschen Reichs vertrat:

Sovereignty is embodied in the nation. The German nation still lives and is organized within a territory. It has not merged in another state voluntarily, but has maintained the will to form a state. Consequently the opinion that Germany has ceased to exist as a state can only be based on the assumption that she has been annexed. From the point of view of law, not military conquest but the declaration of the annexation is decisive. Otherwise a state continues to exist, as it can be proved by many cases of complete occupation of foreign states where the annexation was not declared. But an annexation does not exist. The German armed forces were annihilated. The debellatio was effected. The Allied Powers, however, in their declaration regarding the defeat of Germany of June 5, 1945, 6 p.m., declared: "The assumption, for the purposes stated above, of the said authority and powers, does not effect the annexation of Germany."  On the contrary, the above declaration was affirmed by the British liaison staff with the Zonenbeirat and by various international agreements and official statements showing that the Allied Powers recognize the continu- ance of the German state. Proclamation No. 1 of the Control Council of August 30, 1945, speaks of "Germany as a whole," and Proclamation No. 2 of the "German state" and "Germany." Minister McNeil de- clared in the British House of Commons on Nov. 5, 1945: "Germany has not ceased to exist as a state." At about the same time the Foreign Office confirmed this by the statement: "Germany still exists as a state and Ger- man nationality as a nationality." In accordance herewith also the parties to the ERP treaty assume that Germany still exists. For it states in Article 1, par. 3, that all assistance furnished pursuant to the agreement "'shall constitute a claim against Germany." The aid shall constitute a claim not against the Bizonal area but against Germany, although accord- ing to Article 1, the help is furnished to the US/UK occupied area. Thus, at their annual meeting in Hamburg in April, 1947, the German university teachers of international law unanimously accepted a resolu- tion proposed by Rudolf Laun, stating that Germany continued to exist as a state in the sense of general international law. This seems to us to be also the prevailing opinion abroad. [...] The (Eastern) Deutsche Demokratische Republik is evidently of the same opinion that Germany still exists. Article 1 of its Constitution states that Germany is an indivisible republic. According to Article 1, par. 4, there is-as well as in the West-only one German nationality. The Con- trol Council is still recognized. All Western laws violating the agreements between the four Occupation Powers are considered to be null and void, among others, the Basic Law and the Occupation Statute. We may therefore assume that Germany continues to exist at the present time and is a subject of international law. She can therefore have rights and duties under it. We may furthermore assume that the Bundesrepublik Deutschland as well as the Deutsche Demokratische Repub lik are both administrative and partly self-governing units as the Bizonal Area has been. Though they are not recognized generally, the governments of both republics may be regarded as de facto governments.

Kurt von Laun, 'The Legal Status of Germany' (1951) The American Journal of International Law 267, 268-272 [footnotes omitted]


Fazit: Die Sache ist weniger spektakulär, als man im ersten Moment meinen möchte. Regierungs- wie auch Systemwechsel führen im Allgemeinen nicht zur Entstehung eines neuen Völkerrechtssubjekts. Im Falle Deutschlands ist die Sache politisch brisanter und aufgrund der Nachkriegszeit auch komplexer, aber letzten Endes gilt es aus formaljuristischer Sicht zwischen Völkerrechtssubjektivität und dem politischen System eben zu trennen. Mit anderen Worten: Das nationalsozialistische Deutschland ist schon lange untergegangen, das (ältere) Völkerrechtssubjekt Deutschland nicht.

Russian soldiers in Ukraine?

Ever since the end of the Second World War, most armed conflicts have been non-international in character, with major powers often being involved indirectly by providing funds, weapons, training, and similar assistance to local forces. We have seen this pattern in Syria and, so it seemed, in Eastern Ukraine. To frame it in legal terms: States use indirect force (which is of course also covered by the prohibition of the use of force, cf the good old Nicaragua judgment), but refrain from direct force, i.e. sending their own troops. However, concerning Ukraine, the New York Times reported on the direct involvement Russian special forces in Eastern Ukraine as early as April 2014:
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/21/world/europe/photos-link-masked-men-in-east-ukraine-to-russia.html?_r=0

Prompted by these reports, VICE News tried to find the soldier shown on the picture and proving that the allegations were not correct, at least not in the sense as described by the New York Times:

On the diplomatic plane, allegations indicating direct involvement in the sense of Russian soldiers themselves being present were voiced by France during Security Council Meeting 7165 from 29 April 2014:

We are witnessing a a subversive operation that has been planned, barely disguised and orchestrated by Russia. Russian special forces do not even hide anymore. Some time ago, our Russian colleague denied their involvement in Crimea, while his President recognized it a few days later. No doubt, he will do the same with respect to current events in Ukraine. France strongly and unequivocally condemns those unacceptable attempts by Russia to destabilize Ukraine.

However, Russia has consistently denied at least direct involvement in the sense of sending its own troops to Ukraine at the same Security Meeting for instance (and throwing a verbal punch at the US and its large number of military bases abroad):

With regard to armed forces, our armed forces are on Russian territory. American forces are hardly at home. They are in Australia, Lithuania, Poland and on the Black Sea, where an American vessel has remained longer than it was invited to do. Yes, our troops do conduct training exercises. But they do so in a transparent manner and while upholding all existing international agreements. We do not have any aggressive intentions towards Ukraine. They Kyiv Government should keep a cool head and not engage in reckless activities with respect to the people in the south-east of the country, where there are many Russian citizens as well.

While Russia hasn't changed its official position until fairly recently at least (see http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/putin-denies-russian-troops-are-in-ukraine-decrees-certain-deaths-secret/2015/05/28/9bb15092-0543-11e5-93f4-f24d4af7f97d_story.html), it seems to become harder to maintain every day. As a recent video by VICE News shows, everyone with a computer can determine that it seems very likely that Russian soldiers are present on Ukrainian territory. After all, they themselves, while not wearing official insignia, seem to have posted revealing pictures on Russian social network sites. Web 2.0 indeed does have some strange side effects.

Liberland and international law

on 13 April 2015, Czech activist Vit Jedlicka (sorry for omitting the diacritics) declared a new state – "Liberland", located betwen Croatia and Serbia. According to the website, it covers an array of seven square kilometres which would make it bigger than the Vatican and Monaco. Its motto is to "to live and let live" and overall it seems to have a profoundly libertarian background, eg since it explicitly states its need for people who "have respect for private ownership which is untouchable". The Constitution and its laws are not available yet.

From the perspective of international law, it sounds like a nice example to be included in lectures and/or textbooks. The interesting thing is that Liberland – in contrast to other attempts to found new microstates – like Avalon in Switzerland or the Kingdom of Germany – is not trying to secede from a given territory but take advantage from a Crotian/Serbian border dispute which allegedly makes the territoriy in question terra nullius ("no man's land") and thus up for grabs. Although the big time of conquering hitherto undiscovered lands has passed long ago, there is some unclaimed territory (another example would be Bir Tawil between Sudan and Egypt). If neither Croatia nor Serbia actually claim the territory of Liberland, it could ultimately remain a somewhat forgotten piece of land and provide ground for yet another social experiment in the creation of unrecognized and largely ignored micronations. At the end of the day, all it takes to seize unclaimed territory is some degree of control (depending on its size) and animus occupandi, which both seem to be present in the case of Liberland. The really interesting question arises from the fact that it is not a state trying to acquire territory but an individual/a small group that does not seem to fulfill the criteria to be called a "people" in the sense of Jellinek's three elements of statehood; do the same rules apply mutatis mutandis or could it simply be said that an individual/a small group cannot establish sovereignty on terra nullius – a question that has already arisen in connection with the Principality of Sealand and still not finally settled within academic circles until this very day.
Theoretical questions aside, the experiment suffers from the fact that Croatia exercises control over the territory of Liberland and prevents the establishment of a state proper, which makes this case a rather philosophical one. All those who expected a libertarian paradise for tax evasion and drug use may end up disappointed.

International Law back in the days

[...] the breach of a treaty may, if it is sufficiently serious, be redressed by war, in the last resort, [...]

P H Winfield, 'The Grounds of Intervention in International Law' (1924) 5 British Yearbook of International Law 149, 156

International Law, back in the days

back in the days, when natives were deemed as being unable to understand agreements concluded with occupying powers... taken from Oppenheim's International Law (1905), Vol. I: Peace, page 277