Politainment, diesmal in grün. Oder: Von Maria Vassilakou zu Henry Kissinger

Die Wiener Grünen plakatieren derzeit ein äußerst großes Plakat an prominenter Stelle neben Wiener Naschmarkt und APA. Darauf abgeildet die Wiener Vizebürgermeisterin, an die Wand geklebt und mehr oder minder bewegungsunfähig, verbunden mit einigen Zitaten: "Ich soll den Häupl Michi nicht immer so ärgern", "Ich soll die Pappn halten, wenn der Michi spricht" und "Ich soll dem Häupl Michi nicht immer die Mahü unter die Nase reiben".
 Jetzt könnte man dazu allerhand sagen beziehungsweise wurde dazu auch schon viel gesagt (man lese nur die Kommentare auf der Facebook-Präsenz der Wiener Grünen, Popcorn bereithalten). Unweigerlich muss man unter anderem auch an den Begriff des Politainment, also die Verknüpfung von Politik mit Entertainment, denken. Um nichts anderes handelt es sich bei personenbezogener Politik dieser Art freilich, eine Entwicklung, die insbesondere in den USA mit der Verbreitung des Fernsehers eingesetzt (so gab es beispielsweise seit Dwight Eisenhower keinen US-Präsidenten mit haarausfallbedingter Glatze) und durch das Internet und social media eine neue Dimension erreicht hat. So werden Politiker auch in den hiesigen Medien zumeist weniger anhand inhaltlicher Fragen beurteilt als in Bezug auf ihre Persönlichkeit, allenfalls entfernt mit Politik zusammenhängenden Handlungen oder für ihr Auftreten bis hin zu ihrer Kleidung beurteilt werden beziehungsweise verstärkt auf derartige Merkmale abstellen. Passend dazu auch die Schlagzeile im aktuellen Heute, die daraus sogleich ein kleines Polit-Drama macht (siehe unten).
  Interessanterweise hat sich selbst Henry Kissinger sich in seinem letzten Buch (World Order) dazu geäußert, indem er den Hintergrund für Politainment darin begründet sieht, dass Politiker in einer immer komplexer werdenden Welt mit den von ihnen abgesegneten Regulierugnsmaßnahmen überfordert sind:

"A combination of chronic insecurity and insistent self-assertion threatens both leaders and the public in the Internet age. Leaders, because they are less and less the originators of their programs, seek to dominate by willpower or charisma. The general public's access to the intantibles of the public debate is ever more constrained. Major pieces of legislation in the United States, Europa, and elsewhere often contain thousands of pages of text whose precise meaning is elusive even to those legislators who voted for them."

Wo diese Entwicklung endet, bleibt freilich offen. Ein Schreckensszenario bietet der Film "Idiocracy"; bleibt die Hoffnung, dass politische "Duelle" in Zukunft nicht in Form von körperlichen Schaukämpfen im Stile von "American Gladiators" stattfinden.

the forgotten Genocide: the Herero and Nama

there's a lot of talk on Genocide these days. Notwithstanding the need to criticize the saddening attitude of the Turkish government towards the dark days of the fading Ottoman Empire (and its influence on Turkish communities abroad in this regard, think about the recent demonstrations in Vienna) and the fate of the Armenians, it should not be forgotten that the first genocide of the 20th century was actually perpetrated by colonial Germany in what is now Namibia.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Herero_and_Namaqua_Genocide

Liberland and international law

on 13 April 2015, Czech activist Vit Jedlicka (sorry for omitting the diacritics) declared a new state – "Liberland", located betwen Croatia and Serbia. According to the website, it covers an array of seven square kilometres which would make it bigger than the Vatican and Monaco. Its motto is to "to live and let live" and overall it seems to have a profoundly libertarian background, eg since it explicitly states its need for people who "have respect for private ownership which is untouchable". The Constitution and its laws are not available yet.

From the perspective of international law, it sounds like a nice example to be included in lectures and/or textbooks. The interesting thing is that Liberland – in contrast to other attempts to found new microstates – like Avalon in Switzerland or the Kingdom of Germany – is not trying to secede from a given territory but take advantage from a Crotian/Serbian border dispute which allegedly makes the territoriy in question terra nullius ("no man's land") and thus up for grabs. Although the big time of conquering hitherto undiscovered lands has passed long ago, there is some unclaimed territory (another example would be Bir Tawil between Sudan and Egypt). If neither Croatia nor Serbia actually claim the territory of Liberland, it could ultimately remain a somewhat forgotten piece of land and provide ground for yet another social experiment in the creation of unrecognized and largely ignored micronations. At the end of the day, all it takes to seize unclaimed territory is some degree of control (depending on its size) and animus occupandi, which both seem to be present in the case of Liberland. The really interesting question arises from the fact that it is not a state trying to acquire territory but an individual/a small group that does not seem to fulfill the criteria to be called a "people" in the sense of Jellinek's three elements of statehood; do the same rules apply mutatis mutandis or could it simply be said that an individual/a small group cannot establish sovereignty on terra nullius – a question that has already arisen in connection with the Principality of Sealand and still not finally settled within academic circles until this very day.
Theoretical questions aside, the experiment suffers from the fact that Croatia exercises control over the territory of Liberland and prevents the establishment of a state proper, which makes this case a rather philosophical one. All those who expected a libertarian paradise for tax evasion and drug use may end up disappointed.

D'Amato, Anarchy, and the purpose of international law

In a recent article in the latest American Journal of International Law, Anthony D'Amato examines the structure of international law and claims that its primary purpose is self-preservation, not the regulation of international relations. His characterization of international law along with reference to Schachter's good old 'invisible college of international lawyers'-metaphor may well stir debate. Tom Farer (in a reply in the same issue of the American Journal) for instance already noted D'Amato's understanding of anarchy as chaos. One may add Kant's understanding of Anarchy as 'Law and Freedom without force' (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anarchy#Kant_on_anarchy). After all, international lawyers in particular are well aware of defending the anarchic, yet nevertheless legal, character of their field (already Jellinek has characterized international law in this manner).

Here is the relevant passage from D'Amato's article (footnotes omitted):

the general-systems viewpoint here takes an essentialist position in claiming that the rules and processes of international law can be best explained if we start with the selfprotective nature of all aggregative, interconnected entities known as general systems.

International law is not a stack of rules on a library shelf. It is a professional industry, made up of national officials, diplomats and statespersons, international practitioners and scholars, law professors and students, UN officials, judges of international courts and their clerks, professional arbitrators, judges and clerks of bilateral claims commissions, and advocate-members of NGOs, among others—all of whom were well described by the late Oscar Schachter as an invisible college of international lawyers dedicated to a common intellectual enterprise. Because of the time that these persons have devoted to studying and learning international law, they have invested significant human capital in the system’s continued utility and preservation. To be sure, they will often disagree as to whether an alleged rule belongs to the set of accepted rules of international law (especially if it is their job to come out the way that their employers or their governments demand), but even then they have a personal stake in preserving and maintaining the system of international rules. Governments turn to them for advice as to the international legality of a given policy that the government plans to implement—at the very least in order to help predict the reactions of the legally informed international community. These advisers, both official and unofficial, infuse the international legal system with a dynamic sense of purpose and persistence. Thus, to the tens of thousands of persons making up the invisible college around the world, international rules can sometimes seem incorrect but never irrelevant.

The greatest threat to the viability of the international-law system is anarchy. With total anarchy, international law would perish and might be replaced, if peace is restored, by something entirely different (such as a world dictatorship). Thus, when any controversy arises among nations and the relevant rules are in dispute, the international legal system’s bias for self-preservation will tilt toward the rule that offers the greater probability of a peaceful resolution of the controversy and will bend away from the rule that prolongs or escalates it. That is not to say that justice is irrelevant to conflict resolution. But justice does not function in the abstract; rather, it is perceived justice that counts. And most of the time the perceived justice is symbiotic with the resolution that augurs future peace. Arguably, a justly perceived decision, both in domestic and international law, promotes stability. After the temper of a losing side cools down, the just decision may gradually be accepted as the right decision.

Anthony D'Amato, 'Groundwork for International Law' (2014) 108(4) The American Journal of International Law 650, 652-3.

zu den griechischen Reparationsforderungen

Griechenlands Regierung wird konkret und beziffert die Höhe der griechischen Reparationsforderungen mit 278,7 Milliarden Euro. Die deutsche Bundesregierung hat derartige Forderungen stets zurückgewiesen, insbesondere mit Verweis auf ein entsprechendes Abkommen von 1960.

Das Thema zeugt von einer weitgehenden Vermischung von Politik und Recht, zumal zwischen der derzeitigen Schuldenkrise und den Reparationsforderungen kein unmittelbarer Zusammenhang besteht. Vielmehr gewinnt man den Eindruck einer versuchten Aufrechnung, wonach Griechenland ganz anders dastünde, wenn Deutschland sich seiner Verantwortung stellen würde.

Aus rechtlicher Sicht gibt es zu dem Thema einen guten Beitrag von Jasper Finke auf dem Juwiss-Blog. Conclusio: die griechischen Forderungen sind gar nicht mal so unbegründet, die Durchsetzung ist freilich eine gänzlich andere Angelegenheit. Aber man lese selbst: https://www.juwiss.de/9-2015/

Conor Foley on the limits of forcible and non-forcible humanitarian interventions and human rights

Humanitarian interventions are at best a necessary evil since by their very nature they cause harm to the societies they are trying to help. Even at their most benign, relief assistance operations, such as the one following the tsunami, lead to economic and social distortion, weaken local capacity and encourage dependence. Military interventions are even more destabilizing and result in significant costs for both the occupier and occupied. It is noticeable how few places where large-scale humanitarian interventions took place in recent years have succeded in making the transition to stability. Virtually all these countries remain deeply fractured societies with weak national authorities. Some are effectively still governed as international protectorates, to the increasing frustration of their own populations. [...]
Many commentators have also noted striking similarities between today's debates on humanitarian interventions and those that took place towards the end of the nineteenth century during the 'scramble for Africa'. The missionaries, teachers and doctors who followed the soldiers of European armies presumably believed they were helping to spread the benefits of 'civilization' to 'backward races'. Anti-slavery activists enthusiastically supported military action against the largely Arab-controlled slave trade. The British Navy's decision to interdict slave ships flying foreign flags and liberate their victim was a humanitarian assault on the previously accepted international legal doctrine of respect for state sovereignty. The treaties enabling slave traders to be put on trial by any state that captured them also laid the basis for subsequent laws of universal jurisdiction. John Stuart Mill could be seen as one of the earliest advocates for the establishment of international protectorates, when he argued that' 'Despotism is a legitimate form of government in dealing with barbarians, providing the end be their improvement.'
Of course, the analogies can be overdone but they require western liberals to think more seriously about the supposed universal values they hope their interventions will promote. [...] international human rights and humanitarian law were primarily drafted by western political leaders and the supporters of both movements remain overwhelmingly middle-class, liberal and western in their social backgrounds, yet the main focus of their efforts is in places where quite different conceptions of these notions prevail [...]
This suggest the need to develop a rather different discourse on human rights interventionism, one which is more modest in recognizing its limitations, but more ambitious in recognizing what needs to be done. A useful starting point would be to acknowledge that the conception of human rights western liberals have created, refined and prepackaged for export, is not the only one in existence. A broader dialogue is needed for the ways in which respect for human dignity, personal freedom and individual autonomy can be located in discussions of how to address the injustices caused by the imbalances of wealth and power in the world today. Combating extreme equality are two of the most important underlying causes of conflict and humanitarian crises, human rights and humanitarian organizations haven an important role to play in the arguments for economic justice.

Conor Foley, The Thin Blue Line. How Humanitarianism Went to War (Verso 2008/2010), 233-5 (footnotes omitted) 

Sweden's foreign minister dares to criticise Saudi Arabia over its domestic policies and no one cares

in most Western countries, many are really, really quick when it comes to pointing out actual or purported sexism at home while remaining silent on the situation in countries like Saudi Arabia. One word of caution: Obviously, these situations need to be looked at seperately. Sexism in the West is sexism in the West, regardless of what is taking place in other countries—the often heard "but other countries are far worse" phrase is not an argument but a distraction. That being said, the silence of the otherwise active civil society in Western counties regarding the human rights situation in Middle Eastern countries is still disturbing; in the human rights Utopia, human rights know no borders.

Many just don't care or know since Saudi Arabia is far away; sometimes they don't seem to believe because it sounds surreal or fail to grasp the whole extent of the situation there; and sometimes they are afraid of being accused of racism or Islamophobia. In this connection, many also don't want to be associated with radical opponents of Islam and thus prefer to remain silent. Also, power politics obviously play a role since Saudi Arabias has been one of the most reliable partners in the Middle East for decades. Lastly, one of the principal reasons for this silence could be found in cultural relativism, defined by Jack Donnelly as

Strong cultural relativism holds that culture is the principal source of the validity of a moral right or rule. In other words, the presumption is that rights (and other social practices, values, and moral rules) are culturally determined, but the universality of human nature and rights serves as a check on the potential excesses of relativism. At its furthest extreme, just short of radical relativism, strong cultural relativism would accept a few basic rights with virtually universal application, but allow such a wide range of variation for most rightst hat two entirely justifiable sets might overlap only slightly. (Jack Donnelly, 'Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights' (1984) 6/4 Human Rights Quarterly 400, 401)

Notwithstanding these considerations, Sweden's foreign minister dared to critisice Saudi Arabia for its domestic policies towards women and also critical voices like blogger Raif Badawi. Chapeau. The problem is, however, that no one seems to bother about the political and diplomatic quagmire that followed.

"A few weeks ago Margot Wallström, the Swedish foreign minister, denounced the subjugation of women in Saudi Arabia. As the theocratic kingdom prevents women from travelling, conducting official business or marrying without the permission of male guardians, and as girls can be forced into child marriages where they are effectively raped by old men, she was telling no more than the truth. Wallström went on to condemn the Saudi courts for ordering that Raif Badawi receive ten years in prison and 1,000 lashes for setting up a website that championed secularism and free speech. These were ‘mediaeval methods’, she said, and a ‘cruel attempt to silence modern forms of expression’. And once again, who can argue with that?

The backlash followed the pattern set by Rushdie, the Danish cartoons and Hebdo. Saudi Arabia withdrew its ambassador and stopped issuing visas to Swedish businessmen. The United Arab Emirates joined it. The Organisation of Islamic Co-operation, which represents 56 Muslim-majority states, accused Sweden of failing to respect the world’s ‘rich and varied ethical standards’ — standards so rich and varied, apparently, they include the flogging of bloggers and encouragement of paedophiles. Meanwhile, the Gulf Co-operation Council condemned her ‘unaccept-able interference in the internal affairs of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’, and I wouldn’t bet against anti-Swedish riots following soon.

Yet there is no ‘Wallström affair’. Outside Sweden, the western media has barely covered the story, and Sweden’s EU allies have shown no inclination whatsoever to support her. A small Scandinavian nation faces sanctions, accusations of Islamophobia and maybe worse to come, and everyone stays silent. As so often, the scandal is that there isn’t a scandal."

http://www.spectator.co.uk/features/9481542/swedens-feminist-foreign-minister-has-dared-to-tell-the-truth-about-saudi-arabia-what-happens-now-concerns-us-all/

Why Nations Fail

The most common reason why nations fail today is because they have extractive institutions. [...] their extractive economic institutions do not create the incentives needed for people to save, invest, and innovate. Extractive political institutions support these economic institutions by cementing the power of those who benefit from the extraction. Extractive economic and political institutions, though their details vary under different circumstances, are always at the root of this failure.

Daren Acemoglu and James A Robinson, Why Nations Fail. The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty (Crown Business Books 2012) 368 and 372

VICE: Should the US send lethal aid to Ukraine?

well, saying nothing often says a lot. Like the response of the US charge d'affaires when asked whether the US can assure that no (lethal or non-lethal) aid to the Ukraine would fall in the hands of the seperatists in the Donbas region (video below, if you want to see the relevant passage directly, click here). In no words: they can't.

Die Krone und ihre Inserate

Angeblich sollen Inserate klar als solche erkennbar sein. Angeblich.

International Law back in the days

[...] the breach of a treaty may, if it is sufficiently serious, be redressed by war, in the last resort, [...]

P H Winfield, 'The Grounds of Intervention in International Law' (1924) 5 British Yearbook of International Law 149, 156

Targeted killings

ganz normaler Mainstream in US Policy-Papers:

When containment fails, diplomacy is ineffective, and a full-scale war is
too costly, killing a regime leader is an option a state should seriously
consider. In a world in which states will amass WMD, unlawfully invade
their neighbors, and threaten other’s national and international security,
national security experts and policymakers may need to reexamine their
choices, including killing regime leaders, as a means of ensuring security.

Catherina Lotrionte, 'When to Target Leaders' in Alexander T J Lennon and Camille Eiss (eds), Reshaping Rogue States. Preemption, Regime Change, and U.S. Policy Toward Iran, Iraq, and North Korea (MIT Press 2003) 103, 116.

Ein Argument gegen die objektive Wertlehre/für die subjektive Wertlehre

danke Billa. Ob man diesem Schlüsselanhänger tatsächlich 5,99€ Wert zuschreibt, ist am Ende des Tages dann doch eine subjektive Angelegenheit.

  "Der Wert im Denken der Österreichischen Schule verliert damit seine den Gütern vermeintlich innewohnende Substanz und wird zum geistigen Akt; zur nutzenbedingten Wertschätzung"

http://www.zeit.de/1995/33/Der_Wert_im_Geiste 

Back in the days, when Austria faced a crisis similar to the Greek crisis of today

Back in the 1920s, Austria received a huge loan from the League of Nations because of its debt crisis. In turn, Austria de facto no longer had sovereignty over its budget, while the League of Nations sent a commissioner (Alfred Zimmermann from the Netherlands) to observe the implementation of the conditions for the loan; in particular, Austria had to undertakea considerable reduction of civil servants (about a third).

 The initial Austrian reaction (by then-chancellor Ignaz Seipel) was as follows:

"We have been assured that the Powers which will participate by their guarantee in the work of the economic reconstruction of Austria and the representatives of international capital who will assist financially or with credits will continue to exercise a certain control over employment of the credits granted and over our general national economy. I will reply with all the frankness which our situation demands:

(1) We admit that such a control is inevitable and natural.

(2) It is understood that such a control will not affect the sovereignty of Austria ; for it would be harder and more humiliating for our people, whilst keeping a semblance of sovereignty, to lose their political liberty than once and for all to renounce their independence and become part of a great political entity, and so obtain a share of sovereignty in that of a great State.

(3) For this reason we earnestly desire that the control over the use of the credits should become effective without delay. There is no doubt that dependence, unless it really brings relief, is humiliating, but it would be unreasonable to refuse, simply for reasons of prestige, a remedy which would bring about a cure.

(4) We could not, of course, accept this control unless sufficient credits were granted at the same time. For nothing could justify the control of an independent State except the real help accorded to her."

Also worth reading is Lord Balfour's statement:

 "I think every Austrian citizen may rest assured that, while undoubtedly there must be, under the guidance of the League and through the machinery which is going to be provided, a control exercised over the financial policy of Austria that can only end in benefit to his country, and that when at the end of two years Austria finds herself again a solvent nation, she will be so without having lost one shadow or tittle of any of that sovereignty or that supremacy over her own affairs which we all desire, and, indeed, are bound, as
Members of the League of Nations, to preserve. (Applause.)  

The control, therefore, which will be exercised over Austrian policy is a control entirely for the benefit of Austria. Of course it is necessary, absolutely necessary, if you are to get money from the independent, individual investor.
At present, any prudent investor looking at the state of Austrian finances, seeing how far the expenditure exceeds the receipts, seeing that in every direction public money is being lavished and from how few sources adequate public money is coming in, will say at once :
" You may talk to me of securities, but unless the State to which I lend manages its financial affairs better than the Austria of to-day, I should be a fool if I did lend." I believe that to be a system under which the control, working as it must work if it is to work successfully in daily harmony and co-operation with the Austrian administration, will be able to carry out the necessary reforms, not without difficulty, not, indeed, without suffering, not, perhaps, without for a brief period augmenting the distress which already prevails in Austria, but yet in no long time, after no unnecessary interval, bearing fruit of incomparable value in the direction of turning Austria again into a self-respecting, solvent, economically sound community, capable of holding up its head among all the nations of the world.
Therefore, ladies and gentlemen, control is necessary. How do we ensure control ? We ensure control, the kind of control and the only kind of control which is legitimate but the control which is necessary, by another protocol most carefully drawn up by which the Austrian Government and Parliament and people will pledge themselves to be partners with us in this great effort at national rehabilitation."

 Both of these statements can be found here: 
https://ia902604.us.archive.org/5/items/restorationofaus00leagrich/restorationofaus00leagrich.pdf


See also this excellent article by Gerhard Strejcek (in German): http://www.wienerzeitung.at/themen_channel/wissen/geschichte/493525_Rettungsschirm-des-Jahres-1922.html

International Law, back in the days

back in the days, when natives were deemed as being unable to understand agreements concluded with occupying powers... taken from Oppenheim's International Law (1905), Vol. I: Peace, page 277

HYPO, Moral Hazard und die geballte Inkompetenz

kann man jetzt im veröffentlichten Untersuchungsbericht nachlesen. "Moral Hazard" ist etwa die Rede. Das ist übrigens. Der gleiche Moral Hazard ist übrigens auch bei diversen "Staatenrettungen" (die eigentlich keine Staaten, sondern Großbanken retten, eh schon wissen) im Spiel.

"Die mit der Landeshaftung verbundenen, für Kärnten letztlich nicht tragbaren Risiken aus der Expansion der HGAA waren unübersehbar. Es liegt deshalb ein klarer Fall von „moral hazard“ vor: Das Land rechnete offenbar damit, dass der Bund einspringen würde, sollte die Haftung schlagend werden, so dass es keinen Grund sah, das Risiko zu drosseln und damit auf mögliche Einnahmen zu verzichten. Was für das Land gilt, trifft auch auf die HBInt zu. Auch die Bank sah keinen Anlass, das
Wachstum einzuschränken, weil sie sich durch die Landeshaftung zu günstigen Bedingungen refinanzieren konnte und die Höhe der Haftungsprovision die Risiken nicht angemessen widerspiegelte."


Auch sonst ist der HYPO-Bericht sehr interessant.

"Anders als das BMF, das auf die Beauftragung externer Spezialisten des
Gesellschafts‐ und Insolvenzrechts verzichtete, setzte sich der Verwaltungsrat der BayernLB unter Beiziehung von (auch österreichischen) Experten mit Eigenkapitalersatzrecht und Insolvenzrecht auseinander und schuf mit der Kündigung von Darlehen und der Aufrechnung mit Forderungen der HBInt Tatsachen. Beide Maßnahmen, Darlehenskündigung und Aufrechnung, wären bei der von der BayernLB angedrohten Insolvenzeröffnung anfechtbar gewesen und hätten rückgängig gemacht werden müssen. Die im Kaufvertrag vereinbarte
Gewährung von Liquidität im Umfang und zu den Bedingungen der gekündigten Darlehen war daher in Wahrheit kein Zugeständnis. Das gilt auch für den Verzicht der BayernLB auf 300 Mio EUR Ergänzungskapital, denn auch das Ergänzungskapital wäre bei einer Insolvenzeröffnung verloren gewesen." [...] Die österreichischen Verhandler machen geltend, dass der Bund wegen der Kärntner Landeshaftungen gezwungen war, die Anteile an der HBInt zu kaufen. Diese Argumentation ist nicht vereinbar mit der vergleichsweise geringen Höhe des mit dem Land Kärnten vereinbarten Beitrags. Wird berücksichtigt, dass das Land Kärnten 2009 im Zukunftsfonds noch über rund 667 Mio EUR verfügte, nachdem es
durch den Verkauf der HBInt‐Aktien an die BayernLB 809 Mio EUR eingenommen hatte, so war der vom Land Kärnten zu leistende Beitrag – Umwandlung von 50 Mio EUR Ergänzungskapital in Partizipationskapital und Zeichnung von 150 Mio EUR Partizipationskapital durch die Kärntner Landesholding – unverhältnismäßig gering.
[...]
Bei Berücksichtigung all dieser Umstände kommt die Untersuchungskommission zum Ergebnis, dass die verantwortlichen Entscheidungsträger des Bundes die Verstaatlichungsentscheidung ohne ausreichende Informationsgrundlage getroffen haben. Sie haben weder die Tatsachen angemessen aufbereitet noch die rechtlichen
Rahmenbedingungen ausreichend geprüft. Damit konnten die österreichischen Verhandler keine Alternativszenarien entwickeln, die ein Gegengewicht zur Strategie der BayernLB und des Freistaats Bayern hätten bilden können. Der Gegenseite war es dadurch möglich, Gang und Ergebnis der Verhandlungen maßgeblich zu bestimmen. Dies gilt sowohl für die Verstaatlichung als solche als auch für die Bedingungen, zu denen die Verstaatlichung erfolgte. Vor diesem Hintergrund kann die Verstaatlichung nicht als „Notverstaatlichung“ bezeichnet werden, denn sie war – zumindest in ihrer Ausgestaltung – keineswegs alternativlos."

http://derstandard.at/2000008881351/Hypo-Kommissionsbericht-Verstaatlichung-war-nicht-alternativlos

Heute und die Neonazis

Laut dem österreichischen Qualitätsblatt "Heute" sehen Neonazis so aus:

Österreich und die Pensionen

Die Pensionen sind sicher. "Eine neue Studie stellt Österreich ein vernichtendes Zeugnis aus. Vor allem hinsichtlich der Nachhaltigkeit unseres Pensionssystem ist kaum jemand schlechter als wir."
Also dafür sorgen, dass man gar nicht erst so alt wird? YOLO in Reinkultur? Leben im hic et nunc? Wie so mancher Wiener es treffend ausdrückt: "so oid wüst gor net werdn". Oder, um Sigmund Freud (angeblich hat er sowas gesagt, aber man weiß ja nie) sinngemäß zu bemühen: ohne ungesundem Genuss ist das Leben nicht länger, es kommt einem nur länger vor.

http://www.nzz.ch/wirtschaft/schaulaufen-fuer-die-altersvorsorgesysteme-1.18403115

GIS

Bildunterschrift hinzufügen

Auch wenn diverse GIS-Mitarbeiter einem zwischen Tür und Angel gerne etwas anderes behaupten: Internet allein löst die Gebühren"pflicht" nicht aus. Siehe http://futurezone.at/digital-life/gericht-internet-allein-reicht-nicht-zur-gis-pflicht/87.207.970